m8449.docx EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 5.7.2017 PUBLIC VERSION C(2017) 4857 final To the notifying party Subject : Case M.8449 - PEUGEOT / OPEL Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1 )( b) of Council Regulation No 139 /2004 1 and Article 57 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area 2 Dear Sir or Madam, (1) On 30.05.2017 , the European Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation by which the undertaking Peugeot S.A. ("PSA" of France) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1 )( b) of the Merger Regulation sole control over the automotive business of Opel/Vauxhall ("Opel") by way of purchase of shares and assets (hereafter, the "Transaction").
3 PSA is designated hereinafter as the "N otifying P art y " and together with Opel as the " P arties " . 1. The parties (1) PSA is active worldwide in manufacturing and supplying passenger cars and light commercial vehicles ("LCVs") under the Peugeot, Citroën and DS brands. Through its subsidiary, Faurecia S.A., it is also active in the manufacturing and supply of interior automotive components. (2) Opel is currently controlled by General Motors Company ("GM", the USA) and consists of GM's European automotive business under the Opel and Vauxhall brands. Opel manufactures and supplies passenger cars and LCVs.
4 2. The operation (3) The "Transaction" consists of the acquisition of all assets and shareholdings related to Opel. As a result, PSA will solely control Opel. The Transaction therefore constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3 (1 )( b) of the Merger Regulation. 3. EU D IMENSION (4) The undertakings concerned have a combined aggregate world-wide turnover of more than EUR 5,000 million . 5 Each of them has an EU-wide turnover in excess of EUR 250 million, but they do not achieve more than two-thirds of their aggregate EU-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. (5) The notified operation therefore has an EU dimension under Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation .
4. relevant markets 4.1. Manufacturing and supply of passenger cars and LCVs (6) The Commission has in the past considered separate markets for the manufacturing and supply of passenger cars on the one hand, and of commercial vehicles on the other hand. 6 The Notifying Party agrees with this distinction which is retained for the present case. 4.1.1. Product market definition 4.1.1.1. Passenger cars The Notifying Party's view (7) The Notifying Party agrees with the Commission's decisional practice 7 defining separate product markets for ( i ) mini cars, (ii) small cars, (iii) medium cars (iv) large cars, (v) executive cars, (vi) luxury cars (vii) sport cars, (viii) sport utility vehicles ("SUVs") and ( i x ) multipurpose vehicles.
However, it submits that the boundaries between different vehicle categories are not always clear-cut both in terms of intended use and price. 8 (8) With regard to the further sub-segmentation of SUV s based on the size of the car , the Notifying Party submits that given the recen t development of the segment it sees no clear distinction between the sub-segments, therefore it considers that analysing the SUV segment as a whole provides a more relevant and accurate picture of the competitive environment. 9 (9) Furthermore, the Notifying Party considers that electric vehicles do not constitute a separate product market as electric and hybrid powertrains – as opposed to combustion engines – are available for the majority of the car models, therefore consumers can choose the electri c version as an option for the preferred car model.
10 (10) As for the geographic scope of these markets, the Notifying Party submits that it is EEA-wide in scope as production of vehicles takes place on an international level and the competitive conditions are largely homogeneous throughout the EEA. 11 The Commission's assessment (11) The Commission's previous segmentation as set out in paragraph (7) was confirmed by the results of the market investigation . Indeed the majority of competitors 12 and customers 13 indicated that this segmentation is appropriate with regard to passenger cars. (12) The Commission has previously considered the further sub-segmentation of the SUV segment into ( i ) small, (ii) medium and (iii) large SUVs but ultimately left the question open.
14 (13) The respondents to the market investigation in the present case confirmed that such sub-segmentation is appropriate. However it has to be noted that only a slight majority of competitors 15 agreed with this categorization. Others argued that no sub-segmentation is needed as " [t] he differences on price, quality/features and intended use are not significant from one sub-segment to another to justify further segmentation of the SUV segment. A customer could easily substitute all the models comprised within the SUV segment. " 16 On the other hand, the great majority of customers replied that there are differences – for example with regard to age, lifestyle or income - in the target customers of the SUVs in different sub-segments.
17 (14) The Commission investigated in t he present case whether electr ic cars constitute a separate product market and whether this possible market should be further segmented according to ( i ) technology (electric battery cars and hybrid cars) or (ii) the categories defined for vehicles with combustion engines (see paragraph (7) ). (15) The results of the market investigation are somewhat inconclusive in this regard. While the majority of competitors submitted that electric cars do not constitute a separate product market, 18 most of them distinguish between battery electric and hybrid vehicles.
However, as a competitor indicated " [s] ome HEVS (Hybrid Electric Cars) are more aligned with BEVs (Battery Electric Vehicles) whilst others are closer to ICE (Internal Combustion Engine). This alignment depends on the actual functions, systems and performance […] " 19 (16) As regards hybrid vehicles , several competitors indicated that these – already now – compete directly with combustion engine powered models . 20 As for the battery electric models , competitors indicated that they would become an alternative powertrain choice in 2-5 years. 21 Customers emphasised the price difference between electric cars and combustion engine powered cars and added that currently the capacity of the batteries and the lack of charging infrastructure limit the use of battery electric cars.
22 It was mentioned both by customers and competitors that specific national legislations - such as the tax exemptions in Norway - can significantly influence the competitiveness of electric cars. 23 4.1.1.2. LCVs The Notifying Party's view (17) The Notifying Party agrees with the Commission's decisional practice 24 in distinguishing ( i ) light, (ii) medium-size and (iii) heavy commercial vehicles. 25 (18) The Notifying Party submits that the relevant market encompasses all LCVs under 6 tons but a plausible market segment could be found within this market, comprising vehicles from 0 to 3.5 tons.
26 (19) With regard to pick-up trucks, the Notifying Party is of the opinion that they belong to the LCV market rather than to passenger cars. 27 (20) The Notifying Party considers that - similar to passenger cars - the LCV market is EEA-wide in scope. 28 The Commission's assessment (21) In previous decisions the Commission has considered but ultimately left open whether to further sub-segment LCVs into vehicles ( i ) up to 3.5 tons and (ii) between 3.5-6 tons. 29 (22) The results of the market investigation were inconclusive as regards the appropriateness of plausible further segmentation of LCVs according to their size.
Some market participants in fact indicated that it is an appropriate sub-segmentation, 30 while others indicated that they rather consider LCVs as those commercial vehicles only up to 3.5 tons. 31 (23) In previous decisions the Commission has ultimately left open whether pick-up trucks can be considered passenger cars given that they can be purchased for private use and can transport both goods and people. 32 (24) T he results of the market investigation were not entirely conclusive whether pick-up trucks should be considered as a separate product market. Competitors responding to the market investigation indicated that albeit normally registered as commercial vehicles, some customers use pick-up trucks for leisure purposes instead of business purposes.
However a large proportion of the respondents to the market investigation in the present case indicated that pick-up trucks are mostly considered as commercial vehicles. 33 (25) In previous decisions the Commission has ultimately left open whether the market for manufacturing and supply of passenger cars and LCVs is EEA-wide or national in scope. 34 Competitors and customers alike indicated that there are price differences between countries based on list prices 35 taking into account the specific competition conditions and the different national tax regimes. 36 Customer preferences 37 and CO2-emission regulation 38 might also differ.
Furthermore, retailers export vehicles only to a very limited extent. 39 All these factors are pointing towards national markets. 4.1.2. Geographic market definition (26) In previous decisions the Commission has ultimately left open whether the geographic scope of the market s for manufacturing and supply of passenger cars and LCVs is EEA-wide or national in scope. 40 Competitors and customers alike indicated that there are price differences between countries based on list prices 41 set taking into account the specific competition conditions and the different national tax regimes. 42 Customer preferences 43 ant CO2-emission regulation 44 might also differ.
Furthermore, retailers sell vehicles outside the country they are located in only to a very limited extent. 45 All these factors are pointing to wards national markets. 4.1.3. Conclusion (27) In any event, for the purpose of this decision the Commission considers that the question of the exact product and geographic market definition can be left open, as the Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market even under the narrowest p lausible market definition. 4.2. Wholesale distribution of new passenger cars and LCVs (28) At the wholesale level, distributors or importers distribute vehicles to retailers.
46 The wholesale function is often carried out by subsidiaries of the vehicle manufacturers themselves or by independent distributors, although the latter have to ensure consistency with the central marketing strategies developed by the manufacturers. 47 The Notifying Party's view (29) The Notifying Party agrees with the Commission's decisional practice 48 and submits that the segmentation of the product market between passenger cars and LCVs is sufficient and any further segmentation , particularly by type of car, is not appropriate. 49 (30) As for the geographic scope, the Notifying Party submits that it can be left open, whether the market is EEA-wide or national.
50 The Commission's assessment (31) The Commission found that this market should not be further sub-segmented based on "classes" of cars, given that manufacturers normally distribute a model range which covers different market segments under the same distribution channel. 51 (32) The Commission has previously considered the wholesale distribution market to be at least national, 52 ultimately leaving the question open whether it is EEA-wide or national in scope. 53 (33) In any event, for the purpose of this decision the Commission considers that the question of the exact product and geographic market definition can be left open, as the Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market even under the narrowest p lausible market definition.
4.3. Retail distribution of new passenger cars and LCVs (34) At the retail level, vehicles are sold to final customers by independent or vertically integrated retailers. The Notifying Party's view (35) The Notifying Party submits that the exact product and geographic market definition can be left open for the purpose of this decision. 54 The Commission's assessment (36) The Commission has previously considered a distinction between the retail distribution of passenger cars and LCVs. 55 Similarly to the wholesale distribution, it found that further sub-segmentation is not appropriate. 56 (37) The Commission has so far left open whether the retail distribution markets are EEA-wide, national or local in scope.
57 (38) In any event, for the purpose of this decision the Commission considers that the question of the exact product and geographic market definition can be left open, as the Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market even under the narro west p lausible market definition. 5. Competitive assessment – horizontal non-coordinated effects 58 5.1. Manufacturing and supply of passenger cars and LCVs (39) The Transaction gives rise to horizontally affecte d markets due to the Parties' activities in the following segments: ( i ) mini cars, (ii) small cars (iii) medium cars, (iv) large cars, (v) SUVs, (vi) multipurpose vehicles, (vii) LCVs and possibly (viii) electric vehicles.
5.1.1. The Notifying Party's view 59 (40) The Notifying Party submits that no competition concerns would arise from the Transaction as the Parties combined market shares are relatively low on all plausible markets and the merged entity would be constrained by stron g competitors post- T ransaction. (41) Furthermore, given that all vehicle manufacturers are already present across the EEA and that there is an overcapacity in the market, th e competitors could counterbalan ce in a timely manner and without further investments any attempt of the merged entity to increase prices. (42) Moreover, the Notifying Party argues that the Parties' brands are not perceived as close alternatives, therefore the Parties cannot be considered as close competitors.
5.1.2. Segment A: m ini cars (43) PSA is present in these markets with its "Peugeot iOn ", "Peugeot 108", "Citroën CZero " and "C1" models, while Opel is present through the "Adam" and "Karl" models. (44) Based on a market defined as EEA-wide in scope, the Transaction gives rise to an affected market (combined market share of [20-30 ] % ). Based on a market defined at national level , the Transaction gives rise to affected markets in Belgium ( [30-40] %), Denmark ( [20-30] %) , Finland ( [20-30] %) , France ( [20-30] %) , Luxembourg ( [20-30] %) , Malta ( [20-30] %) , The Netherlands ( [20-30] %) , Norway ( [20-30] %) , Portugal ( [20-30] %) and the UK ( [20-30] %) .
5.1.2.1. Market structure I. EEA (45) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 1 : Mini car segment in the EEA 60 EEA – Segment A Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Renault-Nissan* […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-4]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-4]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (46) The Parties achiev ed a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 20 16.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , whi le Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. B efore 2016, the combined market shares of the Parties were below [20-30 ] % and would not have led to an affected market. (47) The combined market share is below [20-30 ] % and Fiat would remain the market leader post-transaction with a stable market share around [30-40] %. Furthermore, other competitors - some with significant market share such as Volkswagen and Hyundai - would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity . II. Belgium (48) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years.
Table 2 : Mini car segment in Belgium 61 Belgium – Segment A Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% Fiat […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (49) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. (50) The merged entity will face numerous competitors among which Fiat has a very signific ant market share of [20-30 ] % . Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 62 III. Denmark (51) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 3 : Mini car segment in Denmark 63 Denmark – Segment A Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Renault-Nissan* […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [10-20]% […] [5-10% […] [5-10]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (52) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. (53) The merged entity will face numerous competitors , some of them – such as Volkswagen, Hyundai and Toyota – with significant market shares. T hese competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 64 IV. Finland (54) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 4 : Mini car segment in Finland 65 Finland– Segment A Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [20-10]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Hyundai […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Toyota […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Renault-Nissan* […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (55) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [0-5 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [20-30] %. (56) The increment brought about by PSA is very small . Furthermore , numerous competitors will be present , some of them – such as Volkswagen, Hyundai and Toyota – with a significant market share . Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 66 V. France (57) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 5 : Mini car segment in France 67 France – Segment A Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (58) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [20-30 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. (59) The increment brought about by Opel i s rather small . Furthermore , numerous competitors will be present , some of them – such as Renault-Nissan and Fiat – with a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 68 VI. Luxembourg (60) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 6 : Mini car segment in Luxembourg 69 Luxembourg – Segment A Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (61) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. (62) The combined market share of the Parties is below [20-30 ] % and the merged entity will face competition from numerous competitors , two of them, – Fiat and Hyundai – with significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 70 VII. Malta (63) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 7 : Mini car segment in Malta 71 Malta – Segment A Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Toyota […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Hyundai […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% GM* […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [6-10]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% *Without Opel (64) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [20-30 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [0-5] %. (65) The increment brought about by Opel is rather small . Furthermore , numerous competitors will be present , some of them – such as Toyota and Hyundai – with a significant market share . Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 72 VIII. Netherlands (66) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 8 : Mini car segment in the Netherlands 73 The Netherlands – Segment A Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10% […] [5-10]% Renault-Nissan* […] [5-10]% […] ]5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (67) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. (68) The merged entity will face numerous competitors of which two – Hyundai and Volkswagen – have a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 74 IX. Norway (69) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 9 : Mini car segment in Norway 75 Norway – Segment A Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [50-60]% […] [30-40]% […] [40-50]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (70) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [20-30 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [0-5] %. (71) The increment brought about by Opel is negligible . Volkswagen would conti n ue to be the market leader with a market share of [40-50 ] % and numerous other competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 76 X. Portugal (72) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 10 : Mini car segment in Portugal 77 Portugal – Segment A Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Renault-Nissan* […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (73) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [20-30 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. (74) Fiat would continue to be the market leader with a stable market share around [30-40 ] % . The merged entity will face numerous competitors , some of them – such as Volkswagen and Daimler – with a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 78 XI. The United Kingdom (75) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 11 : Mini car segment in the UK 79 United Kingdom – Segment A Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Renault-Nissan* […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] Total (76) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. (77) The combined entity will face numerous competitors , some of them – such as Fiat , Hyundai and Volkswagen – with a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert competitive constraint on the merged entity . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 80 5.1.2.2. Closeness of competition (78) The Parties both target […] with their mini car models which generally have four seats.
81 (79) The Notifying Party claims that […] . It submits that it considers that the closest alternative for the Peugeot iOn and the Citroën C-zero is […] . For both the Peugeot 108 and the Citroën C1, the closest alternative is considered to be the […] . In all these countries, Opel considers that the closest alternative for the Opel Adam is the […] , except in Norway where it is considered to be the […] that is the closest alternative from a business point of view. For Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and Norway, Opel considers that the closest alternative for the Opel Karl is the […] .
In France, the closest alternative is the […] , while in the Netherlands and in the UK, it is the […] and in Portugal it is the […] from a technical point of view. 82 (80) The Commission considers that the Parties are not close competitors to each other with regard to the segment of mini cars. (81) First , internal documents have further confirmed that […] . 83 (82) Second , according to the NCBS survey 84 the brand substitution […] . 85 (83) Third , in the market investigation the majority of the retailers replied that end-customers do not see the Parties as close alternatives in the mini car segment.
86 Indeed, the majority of the customers asked stated the Transaction will have no impact, 87 that the intensity of competition will remain the same, 88 that the price level in the different segments will also remain the same 89 and that the merged entity will not have a degree of control on the market that would make it difficult for other companies to compete with them. 90 The results of the market investigation further indicated that most competitors also do not see the Parties' models as each other's close alternatives in the mini car segment in the affected markets. 91 Moreover, competitors of the Parties consider that as a result of the Transaction, the intensity of competition on the affected markets will stay the same.
92 Also, competitors stated the merged entity will not have a degree of control on the market that would make it difficult for them to compete with the Parties. 93 5.1.2.3. Conclusion (84) For the reasons mentioned above , the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for manufacturing and supply of mini cars in the EEA, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Malta , the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the UK . 5.1.3. Segment B: s mall cars (85) PSA is present in these markets with its "Peugeot 208", "Citroën C3", "DS3", "C4 Cactus", "E- Mehari " models, 94 while Opel is present through the " Corsa " model.
(86) Based on a market defined as EEA-wide in scope, the Transaction gives rise to an affected market (combined market share of [20-30 ] % ). Based on a market defined at national level, the Transaction gives rise to affected markets in Belgium ( [20-30] %) , Croatia ( [20-30] %) , Denmark ( [20-30] %) , France ( [30-40] %) , Greece ( [20-30] %) , Italy ( [20-30] %) , Luxembourg ( [20-30] %) , Malta ( [20-30] %) , t he Netherlands ( [20-30] %) , Portugal ( [20-30] %) , Spain ( [20-30] %) and the UK ( [20-30] %) . 5.1.3.1. Market structure I. EEA (87) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 12 : S mall car segment in the EEA 95 EEA – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (88) The Parties achiev ed a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 20 16.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. (89) The combined market share of the Parties i s below [20-30 ] % . Furthermore, numerous competitors will be present of which two – Volkswagen and Renault-Nissan – have a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exe rt a competitive constraint on the merged entity. II. Belgium (90) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 13 : S mall car segment in Belgium 96 Belgium – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (91) The Parties achiev ed a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 20 16.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. (92) N umerous competitors will continue to be present of which two – Renault - Nissan and Volkswagen – have a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exe rt a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 97 III. Croatia (93) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 14 :
S mall car segment in Croatia 98 Croatia – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (94) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. (95) Renault - Nissan will remain the market leader with an increasing market presence and n umerous other competitors will also be present , of which Volkswagen has a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 99 IV. Denmark (96) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 15 : S mall car segment in Denmark 100 Denmark – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (97) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [20-30 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [0-5] %. (98) The increment brought about by Opel i s rather small . Furthermore , numerous competitors will continue to be present , some – such as Volkswagen , Hyundai and Renault-Nissan – with a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 101 V. France (99) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 16 : S mall car segment in France 102 France – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (100) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [30-40 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [0-5] %. (101) The increment brought about by Opel i s rather small . Furthermore, numerous competitors will be present , out of which Renault-Nissan has a very significant and stable market share ( [30-40 ] % in 2016 ). Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 103 VI. Greece (102) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 17 : S mall car segment in Greece 104 Greece – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Toyota […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (103) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. (104) Furthermore, numerous competitors will be present of which three – Toyota , Renault-Nissan and Volkswagen – have a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 105 VII. Italy (105) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 18 : S mall car segment in Italy 106 Italy – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (106) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. Before 2016, the combined market shares of the Parties were below [20-30 ] % and would not have led to an affected market. (107) The combined market share of the Parties is below [20-30 ] % and Fiat would continue to b e the market leader with a market share of [20-30] %. Furthermore , numerous other competitors will also be present , some – such as Renault-Nissan and Volkswagen – with a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert competitive constraint on the merged entity.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 107 VIII. Luxembourg (108) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 19 : S mall car segment in Luxembourg 108 Luxembourg – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% BMW […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (109) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. (110) The combined market share of the Parties is below [20-30 ] % and Volkswagen would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [20-30] % . Furthermore , numerous other competitors will be present of which Renault-Nissan ha s a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction.
109 IX. Malta (111) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 20 : S mall car segment in Malta 110 Malta – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [0-5] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (112) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [0-5] %. (113) The combined market share of the Parties is below [20-30 ] % and the increment brought about by Opel i s rather small . Renault-Nissan would conti n ue to be the market leader with a market share of [20-30 ] % and numerous other competitors will be present of which Volkswagen and Ford have a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction.
111 X. The Netherlands (114) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 21 : S mall car segment in the Netherlands 112 The Netherlands – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [10-20] % […] [10-20] % […] [10-20] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (115) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. (116) The combined market share of the Parties is below [20-30 ] % and the increment brought about by Opel i s less than [5-10] %. Furthermore, the merged entity will face numerous competitors of which Volkswagen and Renault-Nissan have a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction.
113 XI. Portugal (117) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 22 : S mall car segment in Portugal 114 Portugal – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (118) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [20-30 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. (119) The merged entity will face numerous competitors of which two – Renault-Nissan and Volkswagen – have a market share steadily above [20-30 ] % . Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 115 XII. Spain (120) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 23 : S mall car segment in Spain 116 Spain – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (121) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. (122) The merged entity will face numerous competitors of which two – Volkswagen and Renault-Nissan – have a market share of more than [20-30 ] % . Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 117 XIII. The U nited Kingdom (123) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 24 : S mall car segment in the UK 118 United Kingdom – Segment B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (124) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [5-10 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. (125) The combined market share of the Parties is below [20-30 ] % . Furthermore, the merged entity will face numerous competitors of which two – Ford and Volkswagen – have a market share above [20-30 ] % . Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 119 5.1.3.2. Closeness of competition (126) The Parties both target […] with their small car models which generally have 5 seats .
120 (127) The Notifying Party claims that […] . It submits that it considers that the closest alternative for PSA in all affected markets for the Peugeot 208 is the […] . For the Citroën C4 Cactus, the closest alternative is the […] . For the Citroën C3, the closest alternative s are considered to be the […] based on technical characteristics, and the […] from a business point of view. For the DS3, the closest alternatives are the […] based on technical characteristics, and the […] from a business point of view. (128) On the other hand, Opel considers that the closest alternative for the Opel Corsa is the […] based on technical characteristics.
From a business point of view however, the closest competing model are different depending on the country. The closest competing models to the Opel Corsa from a business point of view is the […] in Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta and Spain , the […] in Croatia and in the UK , the […] in France, the […] in Greece, the […] in Italy and the […] in Portugal . 121 (129) The Commission considers that the Parties are not close competitors to each other with regard to the segment of small cars. (130) First , internal documents have further confirmed that […] . 122 (131) Second , according to the NCBS study the brand substitution between Peugeot and Opel […] .
123 (132) Third , in the market investigation the majority of the retailers replied that end-customers do not see the Parties as close alternatives in the small car segment. 124 Indeed, the majority of the customers asked stated that the Transaction will have no impact, 125 that the intensity of competition will remain the same, 126 that the price level in the different segments will remain the same 127 and that the merged entity will not have a degree of control on the market that would make it difficult for other companies to compete with them. 128 The results of the market investigation further indicated that most competitors also do not see the Parties' models as each other's close alternatives in the small car segment in the affected markets.
129 Moreover, competitors of the Parties consider that as a result of the Transaction, the intensity of competition on the affected markets will stay the same. 130 Also, competitors stated the merged entity will not have a degree of control on the market that would make it difficult for them to compete with the Parties. 131 5.1.3.3. Conclusion (133) For the reasons mentioned above , the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for manufacturing and supply of small cars in the EEA, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK .
5.1.4. Segment C: m edium cars (134) PSA is present in these markets with its "Peugeot 301", "Peugeot 308", "Citroën C4", "DS4" and "C- Elysée " models, while Opel is present through the "Astra" and " Cascada " models. (135) If the market were to be defined as EEA-wide in scope, the Transaction would not lead to an affected market in this segment (combined market share of [10-20 ] % ). Based on a market defined at national level, the Transaction gives rise to affected markets in Belgium ( [20-30 ] % ) , Denmark ( [20-30] %) , France ( [30-40] %) , Greece ( [20-30] %) , t he Netherlands ( [20-30] %) and Spain ( [20-30] %) .
5.1.4.1. Market structure I. Belgium (136) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 25 : Medium car segment in Belgium 132 Belgium – Segment C Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% BMW […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Renault-Nissan* […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (137) The Parties achieved a combined mar ket share of [20-30 ] % in 2 016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , whi le Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. Before 2016, the combined market shares of the Parties were below [20-30 ] % and would not have led to an affected market. (138) The combined market share of the Parties i s below [20-30 ] % . Volkswagen remains the market leader with a market share above [30-40 ] % . In addition, the merged entity will face numerous competitors which would continue to exert competitive constraint on the merged entity post- T ransaction . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction.
133 II. Denmark (139) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 26 : Medium car segment in Denmark 134 Denmark – Segment C Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Renault-Nissan* […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (140) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2 016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , wh i le Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. (141) Volkswagen remains the market leader with a market share above [30-40 ] % . In addition, the merged entity will face numerous competitors. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 135 III. France (142) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 27 : Medium car segment in France 136 France – Segment C Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (143) The Parties achiev ed a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2 016.
PSA had a market share of [30-40 ] % , whil e Opel had a market share of [0-5] %. (144) The increment brought about by Opel is rather small . Furthermore, numerous competitors will be present of which Volkswagen and Renault-Nissan have a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exer t a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 137 IV. Greece (145) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 28 : Medium car segment in Greece 138 Greece – Segment C Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Toyota […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Renault-Nissan* […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [10-20] % […] [5-10] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (146) The Parties achiev ed a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , whi le Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. Before 2016, the combined market shares of the Parties were below [20-30 ] % and would not have led to an affected market. (147) The combined market share of the Parties is below [20-30 ] % . Volkswagen will remain the market leader with a market share of [20-30 ] % . Furthermore, the combined entity will face numerous other competitors of which Toyota has a significant market share. Post- T ransaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction.
139 V. The Netherlands (148) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years . Table 29 : Medium car segment in the Netherlands 140 The Netherlands – Segment C Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [5-10]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [10-20] % […] [10-20] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (149) The Parties achiev ed a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2 016.
PSA had a market share of [5-10 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. (150) The combined market share of the Parties is below [20-30 ] % . Volkswagen will remain the market leader with a market share of more than [30-40 ] % . Furthermore, numerous other competit ors will be present which would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity post-transaction . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 141 VI. Spain (151) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years .
Table 30 : Medium car segment in Spain 142 Spain – Segment C Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [10-20] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (152) The Parties achieved a combined market sha re of [20-30 ] % in 2 016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , whi le Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. (153) The combined market share of the Parties is below [20-30 ] % . Volkswagen will remain the market leader with a market share steadily above [30-40 ] % . Furthermore, numerous other competitors will be present which would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity post- T ransaction . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 143 5.1.4.2. Closeness of competition (154) The Parties both target […] with their medium car models which generally have 5 seats.
144 (155) The Notifying Party claims that […] . It submits that it considers that the closest alternative for the Peugeot 308 is the […] based on technical characteristics and the […] from a business point of view. For the Citroën C4, it is the […] based on technical characteristics and the […] from a business point of view. For the DS4 and the Citroën C- Elysée , it is respectively the […] and the […] from both standpoints. (156) On the other hand, Opel considers the closest alternative for the Opel Cascada to be the […] from a business point of view in all of these countries, except in Spain where it is the […] .
In all of these countries, the closest alternative based on technical characteristics is the […] except in t he Netherlands where it is the […] . Opel considers that the closest alternative for the Opel Astra 145 is the […] in Belgium, Denmark and Spain. In France, the […] is the closest alternative from a technical point of view and the […] is the closest from a business point of view. In Greece, the […] is the closest from a technical point of view, and the […] is the closest from a business point of view. (157) The Commission considers that the Parties are not close competitors to each other with regard to the segment of medium cars.
(158) First , internal documents have further confirmed that […] . 146 (159) Second , according to the NCBS study the brand substitution between Peugeot and Opel […] . 147 (160) Third , in the market investigation the majority of the retailers replied that end-customers do not see the Parties as close alternatives in the medium car segment. 148 Indeed, the majority of the customers asked stated that the Transaction will have no impact, 149 that the intensity of competition will remain the same, 150 that the price level in the different segments will remain the same 151 and that the merged entity will not have a degree of control on the market that would make it difficult for other companies to compete with them.
152 The results of the market investigation further indicated that most competitors also do not see the Parties' models as each other's close alternatives in the medium car segment in the affected markets. 153 Moreover, competitors of the Parties consider that as a result of the Transaction, the intensity of competition on the affected markets will stay the same. 154 Also, competitors stated the merged entity will not have a degree of control on the market that would make it difficult for them to compete with the Parties. 155 5.1.4.3. Conclusion (161) For the reasons mentioned above , the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for manufacturing and supply of medium cars in Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain .
5.1.5. Segment D: l arge cars (162) PSA is present in th ese market s with its "Peugeot 508", "Citroën C5" and "DS5" models, while Opel is producing "Insignia". 156 (163) If the market were to be defined as EEA-wide in scope, the Transaction would not lead to an affected market in this segment (combined market share of [10-20 ] % ). Based on the narrowest – national – geographic market definition, the Transaction gives rise to affected markets in France and Malta. 5.1.5.1. Market structure I. France (164) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years.
Table 31 : Large car segment in France 157 France – Segment D Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% BMW […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (165) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should also be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years; PSA had a market share of [20-30] % in 2016, decreasing from [30-40] % in 2014, 158 while Opel had a market share of [0-5] % in 2016, decreasing from [0- 5] % in 2014. Conversely, Volkswagen and Renault-Nissan has achieved a market share increase of approximately [5-10] % in the last three years, (166) The increment brought about by Opel is rather small and the merged entity would face competition from numerous competitors of which Volkswagen and Renault-Nissan have a significant market share.
Post- Transaction , these competitors would continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 159 II. Malta (167) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 32 : Large car segment in Malta 160 Malta – Segment D Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [10-20]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [30-40]% […] [40-50]% […] [10-20] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (168) The Parties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PS A had a market share of [20-30 ] % and Opel had a market share of [0-5] %, so t he increment brought about by the latter is rather small. Furthermore, Opel's market share has been decreasing from [0-5 ] % in 2014. Conversely , Daimler and BMW could achieve a market share above [10-20] % in three years, (169) There are numerous competitors active on this market, of which Daimler, BMW and Volkswagen achieved a significant market share. Post- Transaction , these competitors would continue to exert competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
161 5.1.5.2. Closeness of competition (170) The Parties both target […] with their large car models which all have five seats . [ …] , 162 […] . 163 164 (171) The Notifying Party claims that […] . It submits that it considers that the closest alternative of both Peugeot 508 and Citroën C5 from a technical and business point of view is […] in France and in Malta. The Notifying Party sees the […] as the closest competing model of the DS5 in these countries. Similarly, Opel indicated that […] of Insignia but rather sees […] in France and […] in Malta as the closest competing model.
165 (172) The Commission considers that the Parties are not close competitors to each other with regard to the segment of large cars. (173) First , internal documents have confirmed […] , 166 […] . 167 (174) Second, according to the NCBS study […] . 168 (175) Third , in the market investigation the majority of the retailers replied that end-customers do not see the Parties as close alternatives in the large car segment. 169 Indeed, the majority of the customers asked stated that it does not consider the Parties to be close competitors with regard to price, 170 quality/features 171 or intended use.
172 The results of the market investigation further indicated that most competitors also do not see the Parties' models as each other's close alternatives in the large car segment in France and Malta. 173 5.1.5.3. Conclusion (176) For the reasons mentioned above , the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for manufacturing and supply of large cars in France and in Malta . 5.1.6. Segment J: SUVs (177) PSA is present in th ese market s with its "Peugeot 2008" and "Peugeot 3008" models, while Opel is producing " Mokka ".
The Peugeot 2008 and the Opel Mokka are sub-compact SUVs but the Peugeot 3008 is considered as a compact model which means bigger load space 174 and also a higher price. 175 176 (178) If the market were to be defined as EEA-wide in scope, the Transaction would not lead to an affected market in this segment (combined market share of [10-20 ] % ). Based on a narrower – national – geographic market definition, the Transaction gives rise to an affected market in France. (179) If the SUV segment were to be further sub-segmented based on the size of the vehicles, the Transaction gives rise to affected markets with regard to small (sub-compact) SUVs both on an EEA-wide level and on a national level in Austria, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain , Sweden and the UK.
5.1.6.1. Market structure A. SUV s - France (180) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 33 : SUV segment in France 177 France – Segment J Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (181) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should also be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years; PSA had a market share of [20-30] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014, 178 while Opel had a market share of [0-5] % in 2016, decreasing from [0-5] % in 2014. (182) The increment brought about by Opel is rather small, and Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [30-40 ] % post- Transaction . O ther competitors would also continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
179 B. Sub-s egment SUV-B: s ub-compact SUV s I. EEA (183) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 34 : Sub-compact SUV segment in the EEA 180 EEA – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Suzuki […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100.0% […] 100% […] 100% (184) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years; PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014, 181 while Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014. Conversely, Fiat achieved a market share increase of approximately [10-20 ] % in the last three years. (185) Although the Parties – who are currently the third and fourth biggest market players in the sub-compact SUV segment – would become market leader p ost- Transaction , the merged entity would continue to face competition from established market players with high or significant market shares such as Renault-Nissan and Fiat and from numerous other competitors.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 182 II. Austria (186) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 35 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Austria 183 Austria – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Opel […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [50-60]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30] % Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Suzuki […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Mazda - - […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Volkswagen - - - - […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (187) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years; PSA had a market share of [5-10 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014, while Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [30-40] % in 2014. Conversely, Fiat and Mazda achieved a market share increase above [10-20 ] % in 2-3 years. (188) The increment brought about by PSA is [5-10 ] % . However, the Transaction would not change significantly the competitive landscape as Opel was already the market leader and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous competitors , some – such as Fiat, Renault-Nissan , Suzuki and Mazda – with significant market shares.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 184 III. Belgium (189) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 36 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Belgium 185 Belgium – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Suzuki […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (190) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years; PSA had a market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014, while Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. Conversely, Fiat achieved a market share increase of approximately [10-20 ] % in the last three years. (191) Although the Parties – who are currently the second and third biggest market players in the sub-compact SUV segment – would become market leader post- Transaction , the merged entity would continue to face competition from established market players with high or significant market shares such as Renault-Nissan and Fiat and from numerous other competitors.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 186 IV. Croatia (192) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 37 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Croatia 187 Croatia – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Suzuki […] [5-10]% […] [30-40]% […] [40-50]% Renault-Nissan* […] [50-60]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Mazda - - […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Honda - - […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100.0% […] 100.0% […] 100.0% (193) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should also be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years; PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014, while Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. Conversely, Suzuki achieved a market share increase of approximately [30-40 ] % in the last three years. (194) Suzuki would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [40-50] % post- Transaction , and other competitors , among them Renault-Nissan with a significant market share of [10-20] % would also continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 188 V. T he Czech Republic (195) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 38 : Sub-compact SUV segment in the Czech Republic 189 Czech Republic – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Suzuki […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Honda - - - - […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (196) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
Opel 's market share has been decreasing in the last 3 years: it had a market share of [5-10 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. Conversely, Fiat achieved a market share increase of approximately [10-20 ] % in the last three years. (197) There are numerous competitors active on this market, of which Renault-Nissan, Suzuki and Fiat have a significant market share. Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [20-30 ] % post- Transaction , and other competitors would also continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
190 VI. Denmark (198) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 39 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Denmark 191 Denmark – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [50-60]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40 ] % Suzuki […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Mazda - - […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota - - - - […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (199) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should also be noted that PSA's market share has been declining in the past three years: it had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014. Conversely, Suzuki achieved a market share increase of approximately [10-20 ] % in the last three years. (200) The increment brought about by Opel is [5-10 ] % and Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [30-40] % post- Transaction . O ther competitors , some – such as Suzuki and Mazda – with a significant market share, would also continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 192 VII. Estonia (201) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 40 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Estonia 193 Estonia – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [50-60]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Honda - - […] [5-10]% […] [20-30]% Suzuki […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Fiat - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (202) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years; PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. Conversely, Honda achieved a market share of [20-30] % in just two years, (203) Although the merged entity would become the market leader (PSA and Opel are currently the fourth and third biggest players) , it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors , some – such as Renault-Nissan and Honda – with a significant market share.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 194 VIII. Finland (204) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 41 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Finland 195 Finland – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Opel […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [60-70]% […] [40-50]% […] [20-30]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Suzuki […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Mazda - - […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford - - - - […] [0-5]% Volkswagen - - - - […] [0-5]% Toyota - - - - […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (205) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years; PSA had a market share of [5-10 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [40-50] % in 2014. Conversely, Honda and Mazda achieved a market share above [10-20 ] % in just two years. (206) Although the merged entity would become the market leader (currently PSA and Opel are the sixth and third biggest market players), it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors of which four – Honda, Renault-Nissan, Suzuki and Mazda – have a significant market share.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 196 IX. France (207) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 42 : Sub-compact SUV segment in France 197 France – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [50-60]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Suzuki […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (208) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [30-40] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [5-10] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. Conversely, Fiat achieved a market share increase of approximately [10-20 ] % in the last three years. (209) The increment brought about by Opel is [5-10 ] % and Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [30-40] % post- Transaction . O ther competitors would also continue to exert a competitive constraint on the merged entity.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 198 X. Germany (210) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 43 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Germany 199 Germany – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Combined […] [50-60]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Suzuki […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Mazda - - […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Volkswagen - - - - […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (211) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years; PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [20-30] % in 2016, decreasing from [30-40] % in 2014. (212) Post-Transaction the merged entity would replace Opel as the market leader but it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors of which Renault-Nissan , Suzuki , Mazda and Fiat have a significant market share. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
200 XI. Greece (213) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 44 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Greece 201 Greece – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Opel […] [30-40]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Suzuki […] [5-10]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [40-50]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Honda - - - - […] [0-5]% Ford - - - - […] [0-5]% Volkswagen - - - - […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (214) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that Opel's market shares have been declining significantly in the past three years: it had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [30-40] % in 2014. Conversely, Suzuki and Fiat established a market presence above [20-30 ] % in the last three years. (215) Suzuki will remain the market leader with [20-30 ] % of the market shares, with Fiat as the second biggest market player, with [20-30] %. Moreover, the merged entity will continue to face competition from numerous other competitors. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
202 XII. Ireland (216) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 45 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Ireland 203 Ireland – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [50-60]% […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% Suzuki […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100.0% […] 100.0% […] 100.0% (217) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014. (218) Renault-Nissan will continue to be the market leader with a market share of [40-50 ] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
204 XIII. Italy (219) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 46 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Italy 205 Italy – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Suzuki […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (220) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been significantly declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014. Conversely, Fiat achieved a market share increase of approximately [30-40 ] % in the last three years. (221) Fiat would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [30-40 ] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors of which Renault-Nissan has a significant market share.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 206 XIV. Latvia (222) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 47 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Latvia 207 Latvia – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30] % […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [40-50]% […] [60-70]% […] [30-40]% Fiat - - […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Suzuki […] [20-30]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (223) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [5-10 ] % and Opel had a market share of [20-30] %. Although the merged entity would become the market leader post- Transaction (PSA and Opel is currently the fourth and second biggest market players), it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors, of which two – Renault-Nissan and Fiat – have a significant market share. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 208 XV. Luxembourg (224) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years.
Table 48 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Luxembourg 209 Luxembourg – SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Suzuki […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Volkswagen - - - - […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100.0% […] 100.0% […] 100.0% (225) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014. Conversely, Fiat achieved a market share increase of [10-20 ] % in the last three years. (226) Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [30-40 ] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors out of which Fiat has a significant market share.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 210 XVI. The Netherlands (227) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 49 : Sub-compact SUV segment in the Netherlands 211 The Netherlands – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [50-60]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% Suzuki […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Mazda - - […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota - - - - […] [0-5]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (228) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. Conversely, other competitors could establish a market presence at the same period. (229) Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [30-40 ] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
212 XVII. Norway (230) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 50 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Norway 213 Norway – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [50-60]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Mazda - - […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Suzuki […] [0-5]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Toyota - - - - […] [0-5]% Ford - - - - […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (231) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been significantly declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [30-40] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014. Conversely Mazda could achieve a market share above [20-30 ] % in just two years. (232) Mazda would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [20-30] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors out of which two – Suzuki and Hyundai - have significant market shares.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 214 XVIII. Poland (233) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 51 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Poland 215 Poland – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Opel […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [40-50]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Suzuki […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (234) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [5-10 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [20-30] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014. Conversely, the market presence of some other market players is steadily growing. (235) Although the merged entity would become the market leader post- Transaction (PSA and Opel are currently the seventh and the second biggest players) , it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors of which Renault-Nissan, Suzuki, Fiat and Mazda have significant market shares.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 216 XIX. Portugal (236) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 52 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Portugal 217 Portugal – SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [60-70]% […] [50-60]% […] [40-50]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Suzuki - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (237) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [30-40] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [0-5] % in 2016, decreasing from [0-5] % in 2014. Conversely, Fiat achieved a market share of [10-20 ] % only in two years. (238) The increment brought about by Opel is small and Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [40-50 ] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
218 XX. Romania (239) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 53 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Romania 219 Romania – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% Suzuki […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (240) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [5-10 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. Conversely, Suzuki could achieve a market share increase above [10-20 ] % in the same period. (241) Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [30-40] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors out of Suzuki has a high market share. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
220 XXI. Slovakia (242) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 54 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Slovakia 221 Slovakia – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Suzuki […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% […] [40-50]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (243) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [5-10] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. Conversely, Mazda could achieve a market share above [10-20 ] % in just two years. (244) Suzuki would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [40-50] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors out of which two – Renault-Nissan and Mazda - have significant market shares.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 222 XXII. Slovenia (245) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 55 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Slovenia 223 Slovenia – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [60-70]% […] [50-60]% […] [40-50]% Suzuki […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (246) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % , while Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [40-50 ] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors out of which Suzuki has a significant market share. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- T ransaction. 224 XXIII. Spain (247) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 56 :
Sub-compact SUV segment in Spain 225 Spain – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [50-60]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Suzuki […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (248) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [30-40] % in 2014.
In 2016, PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % and Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. Fiat on the other hand, achieved a market share increase above [10-20 ] % in the last three years. (249) Although the merged entity would become the market leader post- Transaction (PSA and Opel are currently the third and second biggest players) , it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors of which Renault-Nissan has a market share comparable to the merged entity . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
226 XXIV. Sweden (250) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 57 : Sub-compact SUV segment in Sweden 227 Sweden – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [50-60]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% Mazda - - […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Suzuki […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen - - - - […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (251) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014.
In 2016, PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % and Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [30-40 ] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors out of which Mazda ha s a significant market share. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 228 XXV. The United Kingdom (252) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years.
Table 58 : Sub-compact SUV segment in the United Kingdom 229 United Kingdom – Segment SUV-B Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Opel […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [50-60]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Fiat - - […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Suzuki […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Honda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Mazda - - […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (253) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [5-10 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [20-30] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014. Conversely Fiat achieve a market share above [10-20 ] % in just two years. (254) Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [30-40 ] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors out of which Fiat has a significant market share. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
230 5.1.6.2. Closeness of competition (255) The Parties both target […] with their SUV models which all have five seats and intended for passenger transportation. Although the prices of these models vary in different countries, it can be concluded with regard to the sub-compact models, that the Opel Mokka is priced above the Peugeot 2008 in all affected national markets. (256) The Notifying Party submits that […] . PSA submits that it consider the […] to be the closest alternative of the Peugeot 2008 in all affected markets, while the […] is competing the closest with the Peugeot 3008 in France.
231 Similarly, Opel […] . 232 (257) The Commission considers that the Parties are not close competitors with regard to SUVs. (258) First , internal documents have confirmed that PSA […] 233 , [ …] . 234 […] 235 […] , 236 […] . 237 (259) Second , according to the NCBS study […] . 238 […] . 239 […] 240 […] . 241 242 5.1.6.3. Conclusion (260) Given that the Parties' combined market share is under 40% on all affected markets, the presence of numerous competitors and the fact that the Parties are not close competitors, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for manufacturing and supply of SUVs irrespective of whether the market is defined EEA-wide or national in scope and of whether the SUV segment is further sub-segmented based on the size of the vehicle.
5.1.7. Segment M: m ultipurpose vehicles (261) PSA is present in this segment with its "Peugeot 5008", "Citroën C3 Picasso" and "Citroën C4 Picasso" models, 243 while Opel is producing the " Zafira Tourer" and the " Meriva ". 244 245 (262) The Transaction gives rise to affected markets on an EEA-wide level and – based on a narrower, national geographic market definition – in Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and the UK. 5.1.7.1. Market structure I. EEA (263) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years.
Table 59 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in the EEA 246 EEA – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (264) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of only [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should also be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [5-10] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. 247 (265) Although the merged entity would become the market leader post- Transaction PSA and Opel are currently the fourth and sixth biggest players) , it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors of which Volkswagen, Ford and Renault-Nissan have significant market shares. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
248 II. Belgium (266) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 60 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in Belgium 249 Belgium – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (267) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of only [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should also be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014 250 and Opel had a market share of [5-10] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. (268) Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [20-30 ] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors , Volkswagen having a significant market share. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
251 III. Bulgaria (269) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 61 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in Bulgaria 252 Bulgaria – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (270) The Pa r ties achieved a limited combined market share of only [20-30 ] % in 2016.
The increment brought about by PSA is limited ( [0-5 ] % ) and has decreased in the last three years. , 253 (271) Renault-Nissan would continue to be the market leader with a market share of [30-40 ] % post- Transaction and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 254 IV. Croatia (272) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 62 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in Croatia 255 Croatia – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (273) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [30-40] % in 2014.
256 In 2016, PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % and Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. Conversely, the market share of Renault-Nissan has increased with approximately [5-10 ] % during the same period. (274) Although the merged entity would become the market leader post- Transaction (PSA and Opel are currently the fourth and third biggest players) , it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors of which two – Renault-Nissan and Volkswagen – have significant market shares. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
257 V. The Czech Republic (275) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 63 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in the Czech Republic 258 Czech Republic – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Hyundai […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (276) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of only [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should also be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. Conversely, Volkswagen managed to double its market share during the same period. (277) Hyundai would continue to be the market leader post- Transaction with a market share of [20-30 ] % , followed by Volkswagen ( [20-30] %). The merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors as well. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
259 VI. France (278) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 64 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in France 260 France – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Hyundai […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (279) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [30-40] % in 2014 and Opel had a low market share – and thus a limited increment - of [0-5] % in 2016, decreasing from [5-10] % in 2014. 261 (280) The merged entity would be the market leader post- Transaction , but it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors , some – such as Renault-Nissan and Volkswagen – with significant market shares . . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
262 VII. Hungary (281) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 65 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in Hungary 263 Hungary – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Opel […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (282) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of only [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should also be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [5-10 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [5-10] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014. 264 Conversely, Volkswagen achieved a market share increase of almost [10-20 ] % during the same period. (283) Although the merged entity would become the market leader post- Transaction (PSA and Opel are currently the fifth and third biggest players) , it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors of which four – Ford, Volkswagen, Renault-Nissan and Toyota – have significant market shares.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 265 VIII. Iceland (284) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 66 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in Iceland 266 Iceland – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [10-20] % […] [0-5] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (285) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of only [20-30 ] % in 2016 .
PSA had a market share of [20-30 ] % and Opel had a market share of [0-5] %. I t should also be noted that the increment brought about by Opel is very limited and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous competitors. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 267 IX. Ireland (286) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 67 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in Ireland 268 Ireland – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (287) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of only [20-30 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % and Opel had a market share of [5-10] %. I t should also be noted that the increment brought about by Opel is limited and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous competitor s , some – such as Renault-Nissan, Ford, Hyundai and Volkswagen – with significant market shares. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 269 X. The Netherlands (288) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years.
Table 68 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in the Netherlands 270 The Netherlands – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (289) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of only [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should also be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [20-30] % in 2014. 271 BMW on the other hand increased its market share with [10-20 ] % during the same period. (290) Although the merged entity would become the market leader post- Transaction (PSA and Opel are currently the seventh and fifth biggest players) , it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors of which five – Ford, Volkswagen, Renault-Nissan, BMW and Hyundai – have significant market shares.
Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 272 XI. Poland (291) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 69 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in Poland 273 Poland – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (292) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of only [20-30 ] % in 2016 .
PSA had a market share of [5-10 ] % and Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. PSA's market share decreas ed from [10-20 ] % in 2014. 274 Volkswagen on the other hand more than doubled its market share in the last three years. (293) Volkswagen would continue to be the market leader post- Transaction with a market share of [20-30] %, and the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous other competitors as well, of which three – Ford, Renault-Nissan and Hyundai – have significant market shares. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
275 XII. Slovakia (294) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 70 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in Slovakia 276 Slovakia – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Hyundai […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (295) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016.
I t should be noted that both Parties' market shares have been declining in the past three years: PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014 and Opel had a market share of [10-20] % in 2016, decreasing from [10-20] % in 2014. (296) Although the merged entity would become the market leader post- Transaction (PSA and Opel are currently the third and fourth biggest market players) , it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors of which Volkswagen , Hyundai and Ford have significant market shares. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction .
277 XIII. Spain (297) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 71 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in Spain 278 Spain – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (298) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [30-40 ] % in 2016.
PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % and Opel had a market share of [10-20] %. The merged entity would replace PSA as the market leader post- Transaction but it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors of which two –Renault-Nissan and Volkswagen – have significant market shares. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 279 XIV. The United Kingdom (299) The market shares of the Parties and their competitors were the following in the last 3 years. Table 72 : Multipurpose vehicle segment in the UK 280 United Kingdom – Segment M Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Hyundai […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% BMW […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (300) The Pa r ties achieved a combined market share of [20-30 ] % in 2016 , decreasing from [30-40] % in 2014.
In 2016, PSA had a market share of [10-20 ] % ; Opel had a market share of [10-20] %, decreas ing from [20-30] % in 2014. 281 (301) Although the merged entity would become the market leader post- Transaction (PSA and Opel are currently the second and third biggest players) , it would continue to face competition from numerous competitors of which Ford has a significant market share . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post- Transaction . 282 5.1.7.2. Closeness of competition (302) The Parties both target […] with their multipurpose vehicle models which are all intended for passenger transportation.
The Citroën C3 Picasso and the Opel Meriva have five seats, while the other three models of the Parties are commercialised with both five and seven seats. There is a significant difference between the load capacity which varies between 385 litres (Citroën C3 Picasso) and 679 litres (Peugeot 5008). Based on the number of seats, the load space and the price, the Citroën C3 Picasso and the Opel Meriva on the one hand 283 and the Peugeot 5008, the Citroën C4 Picasso and the Opel Zafira Tourer on the other hand 284 can be considered as closer alternatives. This is also confirmed by the NCBS study (see paragraph (306) and Opel's monitoring practices.
285 (303) The Notifying Party submits that […] . [ …] . 286 On the other hand, Opel considers the […] as the closest technical alternative of the Opel Meriva , however it indicates […] from a business point of view 287 and for the Opel Zafira . 288 (304) The Commission considers that PSA and Opel cannot be considered as close competitors with regard to multi-purpose vehicles. (305) First , internal documents have further confirmed that […] , 289 […] . 290 (306) Second , according to the NCBS study the brand substitution between Peugeot and Opel […] . 291 […] . 292 […] 293 […] 294 […] 295 […] 296 […] .
(307) Third , in the market investigation the large majority of the retailers replied that end-customers do not see the Parties as close alternatives in the multipurpose vehicle segment. 297 Indeed, the majority of the customers asked stated that it does not consider the Parties to be close competitors with regard to price, 298 quality/features 299 or intended use. 300 5.1.7.3. Conclusion (308) Given that the Parties' combined market share is under [30-40 ] % on all affected markets, the presence of numerous competitors and the fact that the Parties are not close competitors, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for manufacturing and supply of multipurpose vehicles , irrespective of whether the market is defined EEA-wide or national in scope.
5.1.8. LCVs (309) Both Parties offer a broad range of LCV across the EEA and offer the following models: (a) PSA: Bipper ( Peugeot ) , Boxer ( Peugeot ) , Expert ( Peugeot ) , Partner ( Peugeot ) , Berlingo (Citroen) , Jumper (Citroen) , Jumpy (Citroen) , Nemo (Citroen) ; (b) Opel: Vivano , Combo , Movano . (310) Depending on the product and geographic market, the Transaction gives rise to several affected markets . The table below lists all the plausibly affected markets : LCV LCV ( < 3.5t) LCV Excl. PU LCV ( < 3.5t) Excl . PU EEA ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Austria Belgium ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Bulgaria ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Croatia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Czech Rep. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Denmark ✓ Estonia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Finland France ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Germany Greece ✓ ✓ Hungary ✓ ✓ Iceland Ireland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Italy Latvia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Luxembourg ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Malta ✓ ✓ ✓ Netherlands ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Norway ✓ ✓ Poland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Portugal ✓ ✓ ✓ Romania Slovakia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Slovenia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Spain ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Sweden UK ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5.1.8.1.
EEA (311) The market for LCVs is quite fragmented with a number of OEMs active across the EEA . Albeit having different market shares in each member states, OEMs generally offer the same models across the EEA . (312) In all affected M ember S tates the market structure for the segments "LCV excluding PU" and the segment "LCV ( < 3.5t) Excl. PU" is not materially different . T herefore the analysis will only include the broader segment but will also apply to the "LCV ( < 3.5t) Excl. PU" segment. (313) If the geographic scope of the market were considered to be the EEA, all plausible segments of the LCV market w ould be affected :
Table 73 : LCV segment in the EEA 301 EEA – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 74 :
LCV segment in the EEA ( < 3.5t) 302 EEA – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 75 :
LCV segment in the EEA (Excl. PU) 303 EEA – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (314) I rrespective of the product market definition , the combined market share of the Parties remains below [20-30 ] % .
(315) On an EEA - wide basis, the Transaction would not change the competitive landscape given the increment of less than [5-10 ] % brought about by Opel . (316) The Parties will continue to face competition from a significant number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan , Volkswagen, Ford, Daimler and Fiat . (317) If the market for LCV s and all plausible segments were considered to be national in scope, the Transaction w ould generate the following affected markets. (I) Belgium (318) On the Belgian market for LCV s , the Transaction generates affected markets for all plausible segmentation s of the market for LCV s .
On these market s , the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following: Table 76 : LCV segment in Belgium 304 Belgium – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 77 :
LCV segment in Belgium ( < 3.5t) 305 Belgium – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 78 :
LCV segment in Belgium (Excl. PU) 306 Belgium – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40] % […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [30-40] % […] [30-40] % […] [30-40] % Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (319) I rrespective of the product market , the Transaction would not change the competitive landscape given that the increment brought about by Opel is small with not more than [5-10 ] % .
(320) The Parties will continue to face competition from a significant number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan , Volkswagen, Ford, Daimler and Fiat . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 307 (II) Bulgaria (321) On the Bulgarian market for LCV s , the Transaction generates affected markets for all plausible segmentation of the market for LCV s . In Bulgaria, all LCVs sold are below 3.5 tons, therefore the market structure for the following segments " LCV( < 3.5T) and "LCV( < 3.5t) excluding PU" is the same of the "LCV" and "LCV excluding PU" segments.
For ease of reference only the latter 2 will be discussed. (322) On these market, the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following: Table 79 : LCV segment in Bulgaria 308 Bulgaria – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 80 :
LCV segment in Bulgaria ( Excl . PU) 309 Bulgaria – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (323) Irrespective of the product market definition , the combined market share of the Parties is less than [20-30 ] % .
In addition, the increment brought about by Opel is minimal with not more than [0-5 ] % . (324) The market leader will remain Renault - Nissan with a market share which is almost double as the merged entity. The Parties will continue to face competition from a significant number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan , Volkswagen, Ford and Daimler. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 310 (III) Croatia (325) On the Croatian market for LCV s , the Transaction generates affected markets for all plausible segmentation s of the market for LCV s .
On these market, the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following: Table 81 : LCV segment in Croatia 311 Croatia – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 82 :
LCV segment in Croatia ( < 3.5t ) 312 Croatia – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 83 :
LCV segment in Croatia (Excl. PU) 313 Croatia – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (326) On the Croatian market for LCV s the Transactio n would not significantly change the competitive landscape given that the increment brought about by Opel is less than [5-10 ] % .
(327) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan , Volkswagen and Fiat. The Commission also considers that Renault-Nissan has steadily increased its market share in the last three years. The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of other established OEMs with smaller – but stable – market shares such as Daimler and Ford . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 314 (IV) The Czech Republic (328) On the Czech market for LCV s , the Transaction leads to affected markets for all plausible segmentation s of the market for LCV s .
On these market, the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following: Table 84: LCV segment in the Czech Republic 315 Czech Republic – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [0-5] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 8 5 :
LCV segment in the Czech Republic ( < 3.5t) 316 Czech Republic – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 8 6 :
LCV segment in the Czech Republic (Excl. PU) 317 Czech Republic – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (329) On the Czech market for LCVs the Transaction would not significantly change the competitive landscape given that will reinforce PSA's leading market position , howevr the increment brought about by Opel is small with less than [0-5 ] % .
(330) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan , Volkswagen, Ford, Fiat and Daimler . The Commission also considers that Renault-Nissan has steadily increased its market share in the last three years. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 318 (V) Denmark (331) In Denmark, the only affected market will be the plausible market for LCV s ( < 3.5 tons) excluding pick-up trucks. On that market, the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following:
Table 8 7 : LCV segment in Denmark ( < 3.5t) excluding PU 319 Denmark – LCV ( < 3.5t) excluding PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (332) On this market the combined market share of the Parties is only [20-30 ] % .
Ford will remain the market leader and maintained a constant market share in the past 3 years. (333) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan , Volkswagen, Daimler which each have a market share above [10-20 ] % . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established OEM s such as Fiat and Toyota . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 320 (VI) Estonia (334) In Estonia , the Transaction leads to affected markets for all plausible segmentation s of the market for LCV s .
On these market, the combined market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following: Table 8 8 : LCV segment in Estonia 321 Estonia – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5] % […] [5-10]% […] [0-5] % Combined […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 8 9 :
LCV segment in Estonia ( < 3.5t) 322 Estonia – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 90 :
LCV segment in Estonia (Excl. PU) 323 Estonia – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% […] [40-50]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [50-60]% […] [40-50]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (335) In Estonia the Transaction would not significantly change the competitive structure as the increment brought about by Opel is small , below [5-10 ] % irrespective of the product market definition .
(336) On these markets, the merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan , Volkswagen, Ford and Daimler . The Commission also considers that Renault-Nissan has increased its market share in the last three years. The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established OEM s such as Fiat and Toyota . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 324 (VII) France (337) In France, the Transaction leads to affected markets for all plausible segmentation s of the market for LCV s .
On these market, the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following: Table 9 1 : LCV segment in France 325 France – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 9 2 :
LCV segment in France ( < 3.5t) 326 France – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 9 3 :
LCV segment in France ( Excl . PU) 327 France – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (338) On this market the Transaction would not significantly change the competitive structure as the increment brought about by Opel is small, below [0-5 ] % irrespective of the product market definition.
(339) Renault-Nissan will remain the market leader and maintained a constant share in the past 3 years. (340) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of other credible competitors such as Fiat, Daimler and Ford. The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established OEM such as Volkswagen and Toyota. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 328 (VIII) Greece (341) In Greece, the Transaction leads to affected markets only on the plausible segment for LCV s excluding pick-up truck s and LCV s ( < 3.5 tons) excluding pick-up trucks.
329 On th is market, the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following : Table 9 4 : LCV segment in Greece (Excl. PU) 330 Greece – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (342) On this market the combined market share of the Parties is only [20-30 ] % .
(343) T he Transaction will reinforce PSA's lead ing position on the market, however PSA 's share has declined significantly compared to 2015 and t he increment brought about by Opel is small with less than [5-10 ] % . (344) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Fiat, Daimler and Ford, which have all have steadily increased their ma rket share . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of other established OEMs such as Volkswagen and Renault-Nissan . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction.
331 (IX) Hungary (345) In Hungary, the Transaction leads to affected markets only on the plausible segments for LCV s excluding pick-up truck s and LCV s ( < 3.5 tons) excluding pick-up trucks. 332 On th is market, the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following : Table 95 : LCV segment in Hungary (Excl. PU) 333 Hungary – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (346) T he combined market shares of the Parties will be less than [20-30 ] % .
Moreover PSA 's market share has declined compared to 2014 . (347) Ford remains the market leader with [20-30 ] % . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan and Fiat, which have all have steadily increased their market share. The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established other OEMs such as Volkswagen and Daimler . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 334 (X) Ireland (348) In Ireland , all the plausible segments for LCV s will be affected .
On these market s , the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following : Table 96 : LCV segment in Ireland 335 Ireland – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 97 :
LCV segment in Ireland ( < 3.5t) 336 Ireland – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 98 :
LCV segment in Ireland (Excl. PU) 337 Ireland – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (349) Irrespective of the product market definition , the combined market share of the Parties is less than [20-30 ] % .
T he increment brought about by Opel is small, not exceeding [5-10 ] % , irrespective of the market definition. (350) Ford, which increased its share since 2014, will remain the market leader. The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan , with a market share comparable to that of the merged entity, and Volkswagen , with a market share of more than [10-20 ] % . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established other OEM s such Daimler . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction.
338 (XI) Latvia (351) In Latvia , all the plausible segments for LCV s will be affected. On these market, the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following : Table 99 : LCV segment in Latvia 339 Latvia – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 100 :
LCV segment in Latvia ( < 3.5t) 340 Latvia – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 101 :
LCV segment in Latvia ( Excl . PU) 341 Latvia – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (352) P ost - Transaction the merged entity will become the market leader in all sub-segments .
However, irrespective of the product market definition, the combined market share of the Parties is less than [30-40 ] % . The increment brought about by Opel is below [5-10 ] % . (353) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan and Volkswagen with a market share of more than [20-30 ] % . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established other OEM s such as Fiat and Daimler . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction.
342 (XII) Luxembourg (354) In Luxembourg, all the plausible segments for LCV s will be affected. On these market s , the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following : Table 102 : LCV segment in Luxembourg 343 Luxembourg – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 103 :
LCV segment in Luxembourg ( < 3.5t) 344 Luxembourg – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20] % Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 104 :
LCV segment in Luxembourg ( Excl . PU) 345 Luxembourg – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (355) Irrespective of the product market definition , post- Transaction the merged entity will become the market leader.
However, the combined market share of the Parties is less than [30-40 ] % . The increment brought about by Opel is below [5-10 ] % . (356) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan , with a market share above [20-30 ] % and similar to that of the merged entity, Volkswagen and Daimler, each with a market share of more than [10-20] %. The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established other OEM such as Fiat and Ford. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction.
346 (XIII) Malta (357) In Malta, all the plausible segments for LCV s will be affected . 347 On these market s , the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following : Table 105 : LCV segment in Malta 348 Malta – Segment LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Toyota […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [10-20] % […] [10-20] % […] [10-20] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 106 :
LCV segment in Malta ( Excl . PU) 349 Malta – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [10-20]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Ford […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [20-30]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (358) Irrespective of the product market definition , the combined market share of the Parties is less than [30-40 ] % .
The increment brought about by Opel is minimal, below [0-5 ] % . (359) Ford, which increased its share since 2014, will remain the market leader. The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan with a market share in excess of [10-20 ] % . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established other OEM such as Fiat and Daimler . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 350 (XIV) The Netherlands (360) In the Netherlands, all the plausible segments for LCV s will be affected.
On these market s , the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following : Table 107 : LCV segment in the Netherlands 351 The Netherlands – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 108 :
LCV segment in the Netherlands ( < 3.5t) 352 The Netherlands –LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 109 :
LCV segment in the Netherlands (Excl. PU) 353 Netherlands – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (361) Irrespective of the product market definition , the combined market share of the Parties is less than [20-30 ] % .
The increment brought about by Opel is below [10-20 ] % . (362) Volkswagen will remain the market leader. The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Daimler, Renault - Nissan and Ford with market share s in excess of [10-20 ] % . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of esta blished other OEM such Fiat . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 354 (XV) Norway (363) In Norway, only the plausible segment for LCV s excluding pick-up trucks will be affected .
On these market, the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following : Table 110 : LCV segment in Norway (Excl. PU) 355 Norway – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Renault-Nissan* […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (364) On the markets for LCV s excluding pick-up trucks , the combined market share of the Parties of only [20-30 ] % .
The increment brought about by Opel is rather small, below [0-5 ] % . (365) Volkswagen will remain the market leader with a market share of [30-40 ] % . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Daimler and Ford with a market share in excess of [10-20 ] % . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established other OEM such as Fiat and Daimler . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 356 (XVI) Poland (366) In Poland, all the plausible segments for LCV s will be affected.
On these market s , the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following: Table 111 : LCV segment in Poland 357 Poland – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 112 :
LCV segment in Poland ( < 3.5t) 358 Poland – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 113 :
LCV segment in Poland ( Excl . PU) 359 Poland – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (367) Irrespective of the product market definition , the merged entity will become market leader, however the combined market share of the Parties is less than [20-30 ] % .
The increment brought about by Opel is rather small , below [5-10 ] % . (368) The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault - Nissan , with a market share of [20-30 ] % , Fiat, Ford and Volkswagen, each with a market share in excess of [10-20] %. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 360 (XVII) Portugal (369) In Portugal, all the plausible segments for LCV s will be affected. On these market, the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following:
Table 114 : LCV segment in Portugal 361 Portugal – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 115 :
LCV segment in Portugal ( < 3.5t) 362 Portugal – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 116 :
LCV segment in Portugal ( Excl . PU) 363 Portugal – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [40-50]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (370) Irrespective of the product market definition , the Transaction would not significantly change the competitive landscape as the increment brought about by Opel is small , below [0-5 ] % .
(371) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan , with a market share in excess of [20-30 ] % , and Ford, with a market share in excess of [10-20] % . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established other OEM such as Fiat , Daimler , and Volkswagen . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 364 (XVIII) Slovakia (372) In Slovakia, all the plausible segments for LCV will be affected. On these market s , the combined market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following:
Table 117 : LCV segment in Slovakia 365 Slovakia – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 118 :
LCV segment in Slovakia ( < 3.5t) 366 Slovakia – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 119 :
LCV segment in Slovakia (Excl. PU) 367 Slovakia – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Fiat […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [5-10]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (373) Irrespective of the product market definition, the Transaction would not significantly change the competitive landscape as the increment brought about by Opel is small, below [0-5 ] % .
(374) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Fiat and Renault-Nissan , each with a market share in excess of [10-20 ] % . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established other OEM such as Volkswagen, Daimler and Ford each with a market share larger than Opel's . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 368 (XIX) Slovenia (375) In Slovenia, all the plausible segments for LCV s will be affected. On these market s , the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following:
Table 120 : LCV segment in Slovenia 369 Slovenia – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 121 :
LCV segment in Slovenia ( < 3.5t) 370 Slovenia – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 122 :
LCV segment in Slovenia ( Excl . PU) 371 Slovenia – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [40-50]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (376) Irrespective of the product market definition, the Transaction would not significantly change the competitive landscape as the increment brought about by Opel is small, below [0-5 ] % .
(377) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Renault-Nissan , Volkswagen , each with a market share in excess of [20-30 ] % , Ford and Fiat, each with a share in excess of [10-20] % . The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established other OEM such as Daimler with a market share larger than that of Opel . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 372 (XX) Spain (378) In Spain, all the plausible segments for LCV s will be affected.
On these market s , the market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following: Table 123 : LCV segment in Spain 373 Spain –LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 124 :
LCV segment in Spain ( < 3.5t) 374 Spain – LCV – ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % […] [0-5] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 125 :
LCV segment in Spain (Excl. PU) 375 Spain – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [30-40]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Renault-Nissan* […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Volkswagen […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (379) Irrespective of the product market definition, the Transaction would not significantly change the competitive landscape as the increment brought about by Opel is small, below [0- 5 ] % .
(380) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible com petitors such as Renault - Nissan , with a market share in excess of [20-30 ] % , and Ford with a share in excess of [10-20] %. The merged entity will also continue to face competition from a number of established other OEM such as Volkswagen , Fiat and Daimler with a market share larger than that of Opel . Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 376 (XXI) The United Kingdom (381) In the UK, all the plausible segments for LCV will be affected.
On these market, the combined market share of the Parties and their competitors will be the following: Table 126 : LCV segment in the UK 377 United Kingdom – LCV Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Ford […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 127 :
LCV segment in the UK ( < 3.5t) 378 United Kingdom – LCV ( < 3.5t) Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Opel […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [5-10]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [20-30] % […] [20-30] % Ford […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Renault-Nissan* […] [5-10]% […] [10-20]% […] [10-20]% Daimler […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Toyota […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5] % […] [5-10] % […] [5-10] % Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% Table 128 :
LCV segment in the UK (Excl. PU) 379 United Kingdom – Segment LCV Excl. PU Company Sales 2014 Sales 2015 Sales 2016 Units % Units % Units % PSA […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Opel […] [10-30]% […] [10-30]% […] [10-30]% Combined […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% […] [30-40]% Ford […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% […] [20-30]% Volkswagen […] [10-30]% […] [10-30]% […] [10-30]% Daimler […] [10-30]% […] [10-30]% […] [10-30]% Renault-Nissan* […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% […] [5-10]% Fiat […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Others […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% […] [0-5]% Total […] 100% […] 100% […] 100% (382) Irrespective of the product market, the combined market share of the Parties will be less than [30-40 ] % .
The increment brought about by Opel is below [10-20 ] % . (383) The merged entity will continue to face competition from a number of credible competitors such as Ford, with a market share comparable to that of the merged entity, Volkswagen and Daimler, each with a market share in excess of [10-20 ] % and larger than Opel's market share, and Renault-Nissan , with a market share comparable to that of Opel and in excess of [10-20] %. Competitors also all indicated in the market investigation that there would be a significant number of alternative manufacturers post-Transaction. 380 5.1.8.2. Closeness of competition (384) The Commission considers that the Parties are not close competitors with regard to LCV and in particular the market segment of LCV < 3.5 t.
This is true with regard to small, medium and large LCV s within this market segment. Based on the information provided by the Parties the Commission concluded the following. (385) With regard to small LCV s , PSA offers 4 models: the Bipper and Partner (Peugeot) and the Berlingo and Nemo (Citroen). Opel only offers the Combo. The small LCV offered by the Parties have different characteristics, in terms of loading capacity, towing capacity and payload: (a) The average loading capacity of PSA's small LCV is significantly smaller compared to that of Opel Combo. The Bipper and the Nemo have an average loading capacity of 365 litres, the Partner and Berlingo of 675 litres while the Opel Combo loading capacity ranges between 1000 and 5000 litres.
(b) The average towing capacity of PSA's small LCVs, ranging between 600 and 750 Kg, is also smaller compared to that of the Opel Combo which has a towing capacity up to 1 ton. (c) Finally, the Opel combo also has a higher payload capacity – 1.5 tons – compared to PSA's small LCVs which is between 1 and 1.25 tons. (386) The medium LCV s offered by PSA (the Peugeot Expert and the Citroën Jumpy) have different technical characteristics compared to the Opel Vivaro : (a) First, PSA's medium vans have 3 or 5 seats while the Vivaro has between 2 and 9. (b) The total load space of PSA's medium LCV in 3 497 litres while the total load space of the Opel Vivaro ranges from 1 000 to 8 000 litres.
(387) Finally , large LCV s offered by PSA (the Peugeot Boxer and the Citroën Jumper) have different technical characteristics compared to the Opel Movano : (a) First, the Movano targets […] . PSA's large LCV are intended […] . PSA's medium vans have 3 and 9 eats while the Vivaro has between 2 and 17. (b) The total load space of PSA's large LCV is 8 000 litres while the total load space of the Opel Movano ranges from 1 000 to 17 000 litres, depending on the configuration. (c) Finally , the towing capacity of PSA's large LCVs ranges between 2 and 2.5 tons, while the Movano can support up to 3 tons.
(388) The above conclusions are also supported by the outcome of the market investigation. The majority of customers did not identify the Parties as close competitors to each other, neither in term s of price, of quality or intended use. 381 5.1.8.3. Conclusion (389) Given ( i ) the limited increment brought about by Opel in all affected markets, (ii ) the presence of numerous strong competitors in each of the affected markets and (iii) the fact that the Parties are not close competitors, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for manufacturing and supply of LCV, irrespective of the product and geographic market definition.
5.1.9. Electric vehicles (390) Although the results of the market investigation did not indicate clearly that electric vehicles constitute a separate product market (see paragraph (14) ), the Commission took a cautious approach and investigated the possible impact of the Transaction based on the narrowest p lausible product market definition . (391) Currently, the Parties' activities do not overlap with regard to electric vehicles . PSA manufactures and supplies five battery electric vehicle s 382 and three hybrid cars, 383 however Opel has no electric vehicle on the market. 384 (392) As to future projects, […] .
385 […] : 386 - […] . 387 (393) Therefore, considering the narrowest plausible product market definition based on the size of the vehicles, […] . (394) O n an EEA-wide battery electric mini car segment PSA achieved a market share of [40-50 ] % in 2016. This relatively high market share is due to PSA's first-mover advantage. 388 However, the merged entity would continue to face competition from numerous competitors such as Volkswagen with a market shar e of [30-40 ] % . 389 Furthermore, several competitors have already announced new launches 390 or refurbishments 391 in this segment. 392 (395) O n an EEA-wide battery electric small car segment PSA achieved a very limited market share of [0-5 ] % in 2016.
393 In any event, the merged e ntity would continue to face strong competitors such as Renault-Nissan ( [60-70 ] % ) and BMW ( [30-40] %). 394 Furthermore, several competitors have already announced new launches 395 or refurbishments 396 in this segment. 397 (396) O n an EEA-wide battery electric LCV segment PSA achieved a market share of [10-20 ] % in 2016. 398 The merged entity would continue to face competition from strong competitors such as Renault-Nissan ( [60-70 ] % ). 399 Furthermore, several competitors have already announced new launches 400 or refurbishments 401 in this segment. 402 (397) In view of the above, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for manufacturing and supply of electric vehicles , irrespective of the product and geographic definition.
5.1.10. Conclusion (398) In view of the above, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for manufacturing and supply of passenger cars and LCVs, irrespective of the market definition. 5.2. Wholesale distribution of passenger cars and LCVs The Notifying Party's view (399) The Notifying Party submits that no competition concern would arise from the Transaction as the Parties' market shares are relatively low on all plausible markets. Furthermore, both Parties have their own distribution channels, therefore their activities do not overlap with regard to the wholesale distribution of passenger cars and LCVs.
The Commission's assessment (400) The Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for wholesale distribution of passenger cars and LCVs, irrespective of the market definition, for the following reasons. (401) First , the combined market shares of the Parties are indeed not high. Given that they do not distribute vehicles of competitors; their market share is closely related to competition at the production level. Therefore, their market share on an EEA-wide or national wholesale distribution market s cannot exceed the figures present ed in section 5.1 with regard to passenger cars and LCVs.
Furthermore, given that PSA's vehicles are also distributed by independent importers, 403 its market share on the wholesale distribution market is allegedly even lower than on the market for manufacturing and supply of passenger cars and LCVs. (402) Second , the Commission considers that the Transaction would not have an impact on the competitive landscape of this market. The Parties have their own distribution channel s which do not overlap, therefore no competition would be lost due to the Transaction. (403) Third , no market participant expressed concerns in during the market investigation with regard to the market for wholesale distribution of passenger cars and LCVs.
Conclusion (404) In view of the above, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for w holesale distribution of passenger cars and LCVs . 5.3. Retail distribution of passenger cars and LCVs The Notifying Party's view (405) The Notifying Party submits that the Transaction does not raise any competition concerns on any of the retail distribution markets , as the Parties' combined market shares are relatively low on all plausible markets and both Parties have their own distribution channels.
Therefore, the competitive landscape will not change as a result of the Transaction . The Commission's assessment (406) The Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for retail distribution of passenger cars and LCVs, irrespective of the market definition, for the following reasons. (407) B oth Parties have their own distribution channels which do not overlap , as both of them are only active in the distribution with respect to their own respective brands. Furthermore, neither pre-Transaction, nor post-Transaction, will competing manufacturers rely on PSA’s or Opel’s distribution channels.
Similarly, retailers owned by competing manufacturers do not distribute PSA’s or Opel’s vehicles and will continue to do so post-Transaction. (408) G iven that the Parties distribute only their own vehicles, their market position on these markets is closely related to their market share in the manufacturing and supply of passenger cars and LCVs. Moreover, as the Parties' vehicles are also distributed through i ndependent retailers (dealerships) at the retail level, their market shares are below their market shares at the manufacturing and supply level. Therefore, their market share on an EEA-wide or national retail distribution markets cannot exceed the figures presented in section 5.1 with regard to passenger cars and LCVs.
(409) PSA has [… ] % of independent dealerships and […] % of owned dealerships . Opel […] does not own any dealership in the EEA with the exception of the UK , where it owns a very limited number of dealerships ( […] ). 404 G iven that Opel's vehicle s , with the exception of the […] dealerships located in the UK, are distributed through independent retailers , there is only a minor overlap between the Parties' retail distribution activities within the EEA. (410) I n the UK, […] . Therefore, the Parties’ market share at the retail level should overall be much lower than the Parties’ market shares on the manufacturing and sales market at national level .
405 (411) Should the geographic market be considered local, there is only one affected market for LCVs , in the Vickers Lakeside commercial area of responsibility, where the Parties will hold a combined market share of [20-30 ] % . 406 H owever, this market share is only slightly above [20-30 ] % and the merged entity will continue to face competition from the independent dealerships of that area. (412) F inally, no market participant expressed concerns during the market investigation with regard to the market for retail distribution of passenger cars and LCVs. Conclusion (413) In view of the above, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for r etail distribution of passenger cars and LCVs, irrespective of the market definition.
6. competitive assessment – horizontal coordinated effects (414) As regards potential horizontal coordinated effects, the Commission considers that the number of competitors active in the market, as well as the nature of the product, make it unlikely that sustainable coordination could be achieved. (415) First, the competitors of the Parties are numerous and large ( Volkswagen, Renault/Nissan, Ford, Fiat Chrysler, Daimler, BMW, Hyundai, Toyota, Honda ). They compete fiercely and represent an effective constraint on each other. Following the Transaction, the number of main players will still be around 10.
(416) Second , passenger cars and LCVs are differentiated rather than homogeneous products, even within the same product market (such as mini cars, small cars, medium cars, large cars, multipurpose vehicles, SUVs and LCVs). (417) For these reasons, it would be difficult for the merged entity and its competitors to reach common terms of coordination. (418) In view of the above, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to horizontal coordinated effects in the markets for the m anufacturing and supply of passenger cars and LCVs .
7. Competitive assessment – vertical effects 7.1. Manufacturing and supply of passenger cars and LCVs (upstream) – wholesale distribution of passenger cars and LCVs (downstream) (419) T he Commission considers that the Transaction would not give rise to serious doubts with regard to the vertical link between the manufacturing and supply (upstream) and wholesale distribution (downstream) of passenger cars and LCVs for the following reasons. (420) With regard to input foreclosure, the Commission notes that that the market shares of the Parties are not very high on the upstream market. Furthermore, there are numerous established competitors present.
(421) As for customer foreclosure, the Parties' market share is also limited on the downstream market and the competitors do not rely on the Parties' as they operate their own exclusive distribution channels and do not distribute the Parties' vehicles. 7.2. Wholesale (upstream) and retail (downstream) distribution of passenger cars and LCVs (422) T he Commission considers that the Transaction would not give rise to serious doubts with regard to the vertical link between the wholesale (upstream) and the retail (downstream) distribution of passenger cars and LCVs . (423) First, the Parties' combined market share is rather limited on the upstream market for wholesale distribution, while numerous competitors are also present.
(424) Second, the Parties' market share is also limited on the downstream market and the competitors' retailers do not rely on the Parties' as they operate their own exclusive distribution channels and do not distribute the Parties' vehicles. 8. Conclusion (425) For the above reasons, the European Commission has decided not to oppose the notified operation and to declare it compatible with the internal market and with the EEA Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1 )( b) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement . For the Commission (Signed) Margrethe VESTAGER Member of the Commission (1) OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p.
1 (the 'Merger Regulation'). With effect from 1 December 2009, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ('TFEU') has introduced certain changes, such as the replacement of 'Community' by 'Union' and 'common market' by 'internal market'. The terminology of the TFEU will be used throughout this decision. (2) OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3 (the 'EEA Agreement'). (3) Publication in the Official Journal of the European Union No C 179 , 07.06.2017 , p. 8. (4) Opel operates ten manufacturing facilities (Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Spain, and the UK) and one engineering centre (Germany) in the EEA.
(5) Turnover calculated in accordance with Article 5 of the Merger Regulation and the Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice (OJ C 95, 16.4.2008, p. 1). (6) See cases COMP/M.1519 Renault / Nissan (1999); COMP/M. 2832 General Motors / Daewoo (2002); COMP/M.5219 VWAG / OFH / VWGI (2008); COMP/M.5518 Fiat / Chrysler (2009). (7) See cases COMP/M.6403 Volkswagen / KPI Polska / Skoda Auto Polska / VW Bank Polska / VW Leasing Polska (2011); COMP/M.5709 Volkswagen / Mahag (2009); COMP/M.5518 Fiat / Chrysler ( 2009); COMP/M.5250 Porsche / Volkswagen (2008); COMP/M.5219 VWAG / OFH / VWGI (2008); COMP/M.2832 General Motors / Daewoo (2002);
COMP/M.1847 GM / Saab (2000); IV/M.1452 Ford / Volvo (1999); IV/M.1326 Toyota / Daihatsu (1998); IV/M.1204 Daimler-Benz / Chrysler (1998); IV/M.1036 Chrysler / Distributors (1997). (8) Paragraph 119 of the Form CO. (9) Paragraph s 121 and 122 of the Form CO. (10) Paragraph s 131 and 132 of the Form CO. (11) Paragraph 163 of the Form CO. (12) Non-confidential r eplies to question 4 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors and non-confidential minutes of a call with a competitor on 30 May 2017. (13) Non-confidential r eplies to question 5 of questionnaire Q1 – Custom ers. (14) See case COMP/M.8099 Nissan / Mitsubishi (2016).
(15) Non-confidential r eplies to question 5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors and non-confidential minutes of calls with competitors on 30 May, 7 June, 8 June and 15 June 2017. (16) Non-confidential reply of a competitor to question 5.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (17) Non-confidential replies to question 7 of questionnaire Q1 – Custom ers. (18) Non-confidential r eplies to question 7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (19) Non-confidential reply of a competitor to question 7.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (20) Non-confidential r eplies to question 7 .1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors and non-confidential minutes of calls with competitors on 7 June, 8 June and 15 June 2017.
(21) Non-confidential r eplies to question 7 .1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors and non-confidential minutes of calls with competitors on 7 June, 8 June and 15 June 2017. (22) Non-confidential replies to question 8.1 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers. (23) Non-confidential r eplies to question 7 .1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors , non-confidential minutes of a call with a competitor on 7 June 2017 and non-confidential replies to question 8.1 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers. (24) See cases COMP/M.6267 Volkswagen / MAN (2011); COMP/M.5157 Volkswagen / Scania (2008); COMP/M.4336 MAN / Scania (2006);
COMP/M.2832 General Motors / Daewoo (2002). (25) Paragraph 152 of the Form CO. (26) Paragraph 155 of the Form CO. (27) Paragraph 156 of the Form CO. (28) Paragraph 163 of the Form CO. (29) See cases COMP/M.4785 Russian Machines / Magna (2007) , COMP/M.4420 Crédit Agricole / Fiat Auto / FAFS (2006). (30) Non-confidential replies to question 5 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers, non-confidential minutes of a call with a competitor on 30 May 2017. (31) Non-confidential minutes of calls with competitors on 8 June and 15 June 2017. (32) See case COMP/M.8099 Nissan / Mitsubishi (2016). (33) Non-confidential replies to question 5.1 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers, non-confidential replies to question 6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors and non-confidential minutes of calls with competitors on 30 May and 8 June 2017.
(34) See cases COMP/M.5518 Fiat / Chrysler (2009); COMP/M.5061 Renault / Russian Technologies / Avtovaz (2008). (35) Non-confidential replies to question 11 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors and non-confidential replies to question 10 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers. (36) Non-confidential replies to question 13 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors and non-confidential replies to question 12 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers. (37) Non-confidential replies to question 15 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (38) Non-confidential replies to question 14 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (39) Non-confidential replies to question 9 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers.
(40) See cases COMP/M.5518 Fiat / Chrysler (2009); COMP/M.5061 Renault / Russian Technologies / Avtovaz (2008). (41) Non-confidential replies to question 11 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors and non-confidential replies to question 10 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers. (42) Non-confidential replies to question 12 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors and non-confidential replies to question 11 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers. (43) Non-confidential replies to question 15 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (44) Non-confidential replies to question 14 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (45) Non-confidential replies to question 9 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers.
(46) See cases COMP/M.5061 Renault / Russian Technologies / Avtovaz (2008); COMP/M.2832 General Motors / Daewoo (2002). (47) See cases COMP/M.6403 Volkswagen / KPI Polska / Skoda Auto Polska / VW Bank Polska / VW Leasing Polska (2011); COMP/M.5250 Porsche / Volkswagen (2008); COMP/M.2832 General Motors / Daewoo (2002). (48) See cases COMP/M.6958 CD & R / We buy any car (2013); COMP/M.6403 Volkswagen / KPI Polska / Skoda Auto Polska / VW Bank Polska / VW Leasing Polska (2011); COMP/M.3388 Ford Motor Company Ltd / Polar Motor Group Ltd (2004). (49) Paragraph 182 of the Form CO. (50) Paragraph 189 of the Form CO.
(51) See cases COMP/M.6403 Volkswagen / KPI Polska / Skoda Auto Polska / VW Bank Polska / VW Leasing Polska (2011); COMP/M.2832 General Motors / Daewoo (2002); COMP/M.182 Inchape / IEP (1992). (52) See cases COMP/M.6403 Volkswagen / KPI Polska / Skoda Auto Polska / VW Bank Polska / VW Leasing Polska (2011); COMP/M.5709 Volkswagen / Mahag (2009). (53) See cases COMP/M.6958 CD & R / We buy any car (2013); COMP/M.5250 Porsche / Volkswagen (2008); COMP/M.182 Inchape / IEP (1992). (54) Paragraph 189 of the Form CO. (55) See cases COMP/M.6718 Toyota Tsusho Corporation / CFAO (2012); COMP/M.3388 Ford Motor Company Ltd / Polar Motor Group Ltd (2004).
(56) See cases COMP/M.7747 PGA / MSA (2015); COMP/M.6403 Volkswagen / KPI Polska / Skoda Auto Polska / VW Bank Polska / VW Leasing Polska (2011). (57) See cases COMP/M.7747 PGA/MSA (2015); COMP/M.6718 Toyota Tsusho Corporation / CFAO (2012); COMP/M.6403 Volkswagen / KPI Polska / Skoda Auto Polska / VW Bank Polska / VW Leasing Polska (2011); COMP/M. 5709 Volkswagen / Mahag (2009); COMP/M.5250 Porsche / Volkswagen (2008); COMP/M.3388 Ford Motor Company Ltd / Polar Motor Group Ltd (2004); M.3352 VW / Hahn + Lang (2004). (58) On the upstream market for supply of automotive components, based on the information provided by the Notifying Party, Faurecia (PSA) does not achieve more than 30% on any potential component by component market.
Therefore, the Transaction does not lead to affected vertical links and negative effects are unlikely to arise. (59) Paragraph 75 of the Form CO. (60) Source : Form CO, Table 82. (61) Source: Form CO, Table 90. (62) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (63) Source: Form CO, Table 112. (64) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (65) Source: Form CO, Table 120. (66) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (67) Source: Form CO, Table 122. (68) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors.
(69) Source: Form CO, Table 151. (70) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (71) Source: Form CO, Table 157. (72) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (73) Source: Form CO, Table 162. (74) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (75) Source: Form CO, Table 170. (76) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (77) Source: Form CO, Table 178. (78) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (79) Source:
Form CO, Table 202. (80) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (81) This is with the e xception of Opel Karl, which has 4/5 seats. See reply to question 1 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017. (82) Re ply to question 1 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017. To be noted, […]. (83) […] . (84) T he NCBS survey (New Car Buyer Survey) is an annual survey widely used in the automotive sector. (85) Table 65, Table 66, Table 67 and Annex 9 - NCBS data – Closeness of competition of the Form CO. (86) Non-confidential replies to question 14.1 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (87) Non-confidential replies to question 17 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers .
(88) Non-confidential replies to question 18 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (89) Non-confidential replies to question 19 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (90) Non-confidential replies to question 20 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (91) Non-confidential replies to questions 19.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors . (92) Non-confidential replies to questions 21.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors . (93) Non-confidential replies to questions 23 and 23.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors . (94) The p roduction of "Peugeot 206 " and "Peugeot 207 " has been discontinued . (95) Source:
Form CO, Table 83. (96) Source: Form CO, Table 91. (97) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (98) Source: Form CO, Table 101. (99) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (100) Source: Form CO, Table 113. (101) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (102) Source: Form CO, Table 123. (103) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (104) Source: Form CO, Table 133. (105) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors.
(106) Source: Form CO, Table 145. (107) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (108) Source: Form CO, Table 152. (109) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (110) Source: Form CO, Table 158. (111) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (112) Source: Form CO, Table 163. (113) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (114) Source: Form CO, Table 179. (115) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (116) Source:
Form CO, Table 194. (117) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (118) Source: Form CO, Table 203. (119) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (120) This is with the e xception of Peugeot E- Mehari , which has 4 seats. See reply to question 1 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017. (121) Reply to question 1 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017. To be noted, Opel […]. (122) [Internal documents] . (123) Table 65, Table 66, Table 67 and Annex 9 - NCBS data – Closeness of competition of the Form CO. (124) Non- confidential replies to question 14.2 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers .
(125) Non-confidential replies to question 17 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (126) Non-confidential replies to question 18 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (127) Non-confidential replies to question 19 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (128) Non-confidential replies to question 20 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (129) Non-confidential replies to questions 19.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors . (130) Non-confidential replies to questions 21.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors . (131) Non-confidential replies to questions 23 and 23.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors . (132) Source:
Form CO, Table 92. (133) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.3 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (134) Source: Form CO, Table 114. (135) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.3 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (136) Source: Form CO, Table 124. (137) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.3 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (138) Source: Form CO, Table 134. (139) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.3 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (140) Source: Form CO, Table 164. (141) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.3 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (142) Source: Form CO, Table 195.
(143) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.3 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (144) This is with the e xception of Opel Cascada , which has 4 seats. See reply to question 1 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017. (145) Response to question 1 of t he RFI01 of 2 June 2017. To be noted, […]. (146) [Internal documents] . (147) Table 65, Table 66, Table 67 and Annex 9 - NCBS data – Closeness of competition of the Form CO. (148) Non-confidential replies to question 14.3 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (149) Non-confidential replies to question 17 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (150) Non-confidential replies to question 18 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers .
(151) Non-confidential replies to question 19 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (152) Non-confidential replies to question 20 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (153) Non-confidential replies to questions 19.3 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors . (154) Non-confidential replies to questions 21.3 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors . (155) Non-confidential replies to questions 23 and 23.1 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors . (156) PSA offers the Peugeot 508 and the DS5 also as hybrid cars. (157) Source: Form CO, Table 125. (158) The Notifying Party submits that […] . (Paragraph 1060 of the Form CO) .
(159) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.4 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (160) Source: Form CO, Table 159. (161) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.4 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (162) France: Peugeot 508 – […] , Citroën C5 – […] , DS5 – […] , Opel Insignia – […] ; Malta: Peugeot 508 – […] , DS5 – N/A, Opel Insignia – […] . (163) France: Peugeot 508 – […] , Citroën C5 – […] , DS5 – […] , Opel Insignia – […] ; Malta: Peugeot 508 – […] , DS5 – N/A, Opel Insignia – […] . (164) Reply to question 4-6 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017 .
(165) Reply to question 4-6 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017 . (166) […] . (167) [Internal documents] . (168) Table 65, Table 66, Table 67 and Annex 9 - NCBS data – Closeness of competition of the Form CO. (169) Non-confidential replies to question 14.4 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (170) Non-confidential replies to question 16.4.1 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (171) Non-confidential replies to question 16.4.2 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (172) Non-confidential replies to question 16.4.3 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (173) Non-confidential replies to questions 20.4.1 and 20.4.2 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors .
(174) Opel Mokka: 356 litres ; Peugeot 2008: 410 litres ; Peugeot 3008: 520 litres . (175) In France for example, the entry level price of these cars are the following: Peugeot 2008 – […] , Opel Mokka – […] , Peugeot 3008 – […] . The same difference can be observed with regard to the average price: Peugeot 2008 – […] , Opel Mokka – […] , Peugeot 3008 – […] . (176) Reply to questions 7-9 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017 . (177) Source: Form CO, Table 126. (178) The Notifying Party submits that PSA's market share decreased due to […] (Paragraph 1072 of the Form CO) . (179) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors.
(180) Source: Form CO, Table 84. (181) The Notifying Party submits that PSA's market share decreased due to […] (Paragraph 573 of the Form CO) . (182) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (183) Source: Form CO, Table 89. (184) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (185) Source: Form CO, Table 93. (186) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (187) Source: Form CO, Table 102. (188) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (189) Source:
Form CO, Table 107. (190) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (191) Source: Form CO, Table 115. (192) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (193) Source: Form CO, Table 116. (194) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (195) Source: Form CO, Table 121. (196) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (197) Source: Form CO, Table 127. (198) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (199) Source: Form CO, Table 132.
(200) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (201) Source: Form CO, Table 135. (202) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (203) Source: Form CO, Table 140. (204) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (205) Source: Form CO, Table 146. (206) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (207) Source: Form CO, Table 147. (208) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (209) Source: Form CO, Table 153. (210) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors.
(211) Source: Form CO, Table 165. (212) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (213) Source: Form CO, Table 171. (214) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (215) Source: Form CO, Table 173. (216) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (217) Source: Form CO, Table 180. (218) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (219) Source: Form CO, Table 184. (220) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (221) Source:
Form CO, Table 185. (222) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (223) Source: Form CO, Table 190. (224) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (225) Source: Form CO, Table 196. (226) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (227) Source: Form CO, Table 201. (228) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (229) Source: Form CO, Table 204. (230) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.5 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (231) Reply to questions 7-9 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017 and reply to question 2-3 of RFI02 of 15 June 2017 .
(232) Opel indicated the following models as the closest alternative of Opel Mokka (if different in the following order: from a technical point of view – from a business point of view): Austria: […] – […] ; Belgium: […] – […] ; Croatia: […] ; the Czech Republic: […] – […] ; Denmark: […] – […] ; Finland: […] – […] ; France: […] – […] ; Germany: […] – […] ; Greece: […] – […] ; Ireland: […] – […] ; Italy: […] ; Latvia: […] – […] ; Luxembourg : […]–[…]; the Netherlands: […]–[…]; Norway: […]–[…]; Poland: […]–[…];
Portugal: […]; Romania: […]–[…]; Slovakia: […]–[…]; Slovenia: […]–[…]; Spain: […]–[…]; Sweden: […]–[…]; the UK: […]–[…] ([…]). (233) […] . (234) [Internal documents] . (235) [Internal documents] . (236) The study examined features such as exterior and interior appearance, interior controls, front seat storage, drives visibility, front row roominess and comfort, rear seat environment, cargo area and value for money. (237) The study examined features such as driver visibility, braking, ride, higher speed handling, driver comfort and roominess, interior quietness, acceleration, low speed manoeuvrability and engine sound.
(238) […]. (239) […]. (240) […]. (241) […]. (242) Table 65, Table 66, Table 67 and Annex 9 - NCBS data – Closeness of competition of the Form CO. (243) The p roduction of "Peugeot 807" and "Citroën C8" has been discontinued. (244) The production of "Opel Zafira (Family) and "Opel Agila " has been discontinued in 2015. (245) It should be noted however that among the affected markets, PSA does not commercialise the Citroën C3 Picasso in Iceland and Ireland and Opel does not sell the Meriva model in Iceland. (246) Source: Form CO, Table 85. (247) According to the Notifying Party, Opel's market share has dropped due to […] (paragraph 586 of the Form CO).
(248) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (249) Source: Form CO, Table 94. (250) PSA submits that its market share has dropped due to […] (paragraph 692 of the Form CO). (251) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (252) Source: Form CO, Table 98. (253) The Notifying Party s ubmits that this is due to […] on the one hand and […] on the other hand (paragraph 739 of the Form CO). (254) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (255) Source: Form CO, Table 103. (256) PSA submits that its market share has decreased due to […] (paragraph 802 of the Form CO).
(257) Non-confidential replies to question 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors . (258) Source : Form CO, Table 108. (259) Non-confidential replies to question 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors . (260) Source : Form CO, Table 128. (261) According to the Notifying Party, Opel's market share has dropped due to […] (paragraph 586 of the Form CO). (262) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (263) Source: Form CO, Table 137. (264) According to the Notifying Party, Opel's market share has dropped due to […] (paragraph 1205 of the Form CO). (265) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors.
(266) Source: Form CO, Table 139. (267) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (268) Source: Form CO, Table 141. (269) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (270) Source: Form CO, Table 166. (271) According to the Notifying Party, Opel's market share has dropped due to […] (paragraph 1205 of the Form CO). (272) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (273) Source: Form CO, Table 174. (274) PSA submits that […] (paragraph 1661 of the Form CO). (275) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors.
(276) Source: Form CO, Table 186. (277) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (278) Source: Form CO, Table 197. (279) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (280) Source: Form CO, Table 205. (281) According to the Notifying Party, Opel's market share has dropped due to […] (paragraph 2019 of the Form CO). (282) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.6 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (283) Both 5 seaters; load capacity: Citroën C3 Picasso – 385 litres, Opel Meriva – 400 litres; entry level price e.g. in Belgium:
Citroën C3 Picasso – […] , Opel Meriva – […] ; average price e.g. in Belgium: Citroën C3 Picasso – […] , Opel Meriva – […] . (284) All 5/7 seaters; load capacity: Peugeot 5008 – 679 litres, Citroën C4 Picasso – 537 litres, Opel Zafira Tourer – 650 litres; entry level price e.g. in Belgium: Peugeot 5008 – […] , Citroën C4 Picasso – […] , Opel Zafira Tourer – […] ; average price e.g. in Belgium: Peugeot 5008 – […] , Citroën C4 Picasso – EUR […] , Opel Zafira Tourer – […] . (285) [Internal documents] . (286) On all affected markets PSA considers that the closest alternative of the Peugeot 5008 is the […] from a technical point of view and the […] from a business point of view.
PSA sees the […] (technical) and the […] (business) as the closest model to the Citroën C3 Picasso. PSA submits that the closest alternative of the Citroën C4 Picasso is the […] both from a technical and a business point of view (reply to questions 10-12 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017). (287) These are […] (reply to questions 10-12 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017). (288) Opel considers the […] to be the closest technical alternative, while sees the […] , the […] , the […] or the […] as the closest competitor from a business point of view based on the country in question (reply to questions 10-12 of RFI01 of 2 June 2017).
(289) […] . (290) [Internal documents] . (291) […]. (292) […]. (293) […] . (294) […] . (295) […] . (296) […] . (297) Non-confidential replies to question 14.6 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (298) Non-confidential replies to question 16.6.1 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (299) Non-confidential replies to question 16.6.2 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (300) Non-confidential replies to question 16.6.3 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers . (301) Source: Form CO, Table 86. (302) Source: Form CO, Table 87. (303) Source: Form CO, Table 88. (304) Source: Form CO, Table 95. (305) Source:
Form CO, Table 96. (306) Source: Form CO, Table 97. (307) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (308) Source: Form CO, Table 99. (309) Source: Form CO, Table 100. (310) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (311) Source: Form CO, Table 104. (312) Source: Form CO, Table 105. (313) Source: Form CO, Table 106. (314) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (315) Source: Form CO, Table 109. (316) Source: Form CO, Table 110. (317) Source: Form CO, Table 111. (318) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors.
(319) Source: Reply to RFI02 of 15 June 2017, Table 1. (320) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (321) Source: Form CO, Table 117. (322) Source: Form CO, Table 118. (323) Source: Form CO, Table 119. (324) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (325) Source: Form CO, Table 129. (326) Source: Form CO, Table 130. (327) Source: Form CO, Table 131. (328) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (329) A s mentioned in paragraph 311 above, the market structure for the segments "LCV excluding PU" and the segment "LCV ( < 3.5t) Excl.
PU" is not materially different. Therefore the analysis only include s the broader segment but will also apply to the "LCV ( < 3.5t) Excl. PU" segment. (330) Source: Form CO, Table 136. (331) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (332) As mentioned in paragraph 311 above, the market structure for the segments "LCV excluding PU" and the segment "LCV ( < 3.5t) Excl. PU" is not materially different. Therefore the analysis only includes the broader segment but will also apply to the "LCV ( < 3.5t) Excl. PU" segment. (333) Source: Form CO, Table 138. (334) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors.
(335) Source: Form CO, Table 142. (336) Source: Form CO, Table 143. (337) Source: Form CO, Table 144. (338) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (339) Source: Form CO, Table 148. (340) Source: Form CO, Table 149. (341) Source: Form CO, Table 150. (342) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (343) Source: Form CO, Table 154. (344) Source: Form CO, Table 155. (345) Source: Form CO, Table 156. (346) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (347) According to IHS, all LCVs sold in Malta are LCVs below 3.5t. , t herefore, an analysis of the plausible market of LCV ( < 3.5t) would be exactly the same to the analysis on all LCVs .
(348) Source: Form CO, Table 160. (349) Source: Form CO, Table 161. (350) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (351) Source: Form CO, Table 167. (352) Source: Form CO, Table 168. (353) Source: Form CO, Table 169. (354) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (355) Source: Form CO, Table 172. (356) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (357) Source: Form CO, Table 175. (358) Source: Form CO, Table 176. (359) Source: Form CO, Table 177. (360) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors.
(361) Source: Form CO, Table 181. (362) Source: Form CO, Table 182. (363) Source: Form CO, Table 183. (364) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (365) Source: Form CO, Table 187. (366) Source: Form CO, Table 188. (367) Source: Form CO, Table 189. (368) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (369) Source: Form CO, Table 191. (370) Source: Form CO, Table 192. (371) Source: Form CO, Table 193. (372) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (373) Source: Form CO, Table 198. (374) Source:
Form CO, Table 199. (375) Source: Form CO, Table 200. (376) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (377) Source: Form CO, Table 206. (378) Source: Form CO, Table 207. (379) Source: Form CO, Table 208. (380) Non-confidential replies to q uestion 19.7 of questionnaire Q2 – Competitors. (381) Non-confidential replies to question 1 6.7.4.1.1 to 16.7.4.1.3 and 16.7.4.2.1 to 16.7.4.2.3 of questionnaire Q1 – Customers. (382) Two mini cars: the Peugeot iOn and Citroën CZero ; a small car: the Citroën Méhari ; and two LCVs: the Peugeot Partner and the Citroën Berlingo (see table 14 of the Form CO).
(383) Two large cars: the Peugeot 508 and the DS5; and an SUV, the Peugeot 3008 (see table 14 of the Form CO). (384) Opel used to commercialise a hybrid version of its Ampera (medium) model but the production was stopped in 2015 (see paragraph 138 of the Form CO). (385) Paragraph 139 of the Form CO. (386) […] . (387) Paragraph 140 of the Form CO. (388) Paragraph 146 of the Form CO. (389) Paragraph 147 of the Form CO. (390) E.g . Renault-Nissan – "Renault Twingo " – last quarter of 2018; Toyota – " Aygo " – first quarter of 2019; BMW – "Mini" – second quarter of 2019. (391) E.g. Fiat – "500e" – 2019;
Volkswagen – " eUp !" – first qu arter of 2020; BMW – "i3" – May 2020; Bolloré – " BlueCar " – first quarter of 2023. (392) Table 15 of the Form CO. (393) Paragraph 146 of the Form CO. (394) Paragraph 147 of the Form CO. (395) E.g . Hyundai – " Kona " – first quarter of 2018; Volkswagen – "Audi A1" and "Audi Q2" – last quarter of 2019; Volkswagen – "Polo" – first quarter of 2020; Volkswagen – " Seat Ibiza " – last quarter of 2020; Volkswagen – "Skoda Fabia " – first quarter of 2021; Volkswagen – " Seat Arona " – 2022; Ford – "Fiesta" – first quarter of 2023.
(396) E.g. Renault-Nissan – "Renault Zoe" – last quarter of 2023. (397) Table 15 of the Form CO. (398) Paragraph 146 of the Form CO. (399) Paragraph 147 of the Form CO. (400) E.g . Volkswagen – " Krafter " – third quarter of 2017; Daimler – "Mercedes Vito " – last quarter of 2017; Renault-Nissan – "Renault Master" – last quarter of 2017; Daimler – "Sprinter" – last quarter of 2018; Ford – " Transit Connect " – first quarter of 2019; Fiat – " Doblo " – first quarter of 2019; Daimler – "Mercedes Citan " – last quarter of 2019; Volkswagen – " Caddy " – first quarter of 2020.
(401) E.g. Renault-Nissan – " Kangoo " – first quarter of 2019 . (402) Table 15 of the Form CO. (403) Table 17 of the Form CO. (404) Paragraphs 193-194 of the Form CO. (405) Paragraph 207 of the Form CO. (406) Paragraph 222 of the Form CO .